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


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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

**NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS
AND THE U.S. MILITARY:
PAST, PRESENT, AND PROSPECTS**

by

Jeff R. Brown

June 1995

Thesis Advisor:

Mark J. Eitelberg

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**NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS AND THE U.S. MILITARY:
PAST, PRESENT, AND PROSPECTS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

Non-traditional military missions have become a topical issue in the United States since the end of the Cold War and are an important concern for the All-Volunteer Force. Many feel that military involvement in activities such as disaster relief, civil-military programs, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping is revolutionary, inappropriate, and contrary to the central purpose of the armed forces. However, American military forces have participated in non-traditional missions throughout the country's history. These missions have been a vital part of military service as the focus of the military changed along with the nation. This thesis defines non-traditional missions and reviews U.S. military participation over three periods: 1776 to 1973, when America's involvement in the Vietnam war ended and the All-Volunteer Force was initiated; 1973 until the end of the Cold War in 1989; and 1989 to the present. This sets the stage for a detailed evaluation of the reasons for and against continued involvement in non-traditional missions. Recommendations balancing the military's legacy of non-traditional missions with current needs and constraints are offered to suggest a course for the future.

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I. INTRODUCTION

"Non-traditional" missions of the United States military are an important topical issue. In the past few years, this term has been the center of a large, extremely-polarized, and ongoing debate. One can hardly pick up a newspaper these days without finding some mention of such actions and their effects on the armed services and the nation. As an example, just as this paper was in its final stages, America was stunned by the tragic bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. In searching for possible solutions to prevent further incidents, the White House suggested an increased domestic anti-terrorism role for the military. The ensuing controversy was not limited by political party affiliations or normal partisan politics. (Baltimore Sun, 1995; Peters, 1995)

A. DEFINING NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS

Before this discussion goes any further it is necessary to define non-traditional missions. This is not a simple task because of the wide variety of existing ideas. Additional phrases in use include "operations other than war," "peacetime contingency operations," and "alternative," "noncombat," "secondary," "supporting," or "other" missions. However, as a starting point, many feel that the traditional mission of the American armed forces is to "fight and win the nation's wars." (Summers, 1993, p. 69) Given this, the simplified definition of non-traditional missions is every other mission the military does that is not directed toward the preparation for, or engagement in, warfighting. These missions include disaster relief, peacekeeping and other peace operations, humanitarian assistance, serving as an agent of social change, civil-military coordination and assistance, evacuation of

noncombatants, drug and migrant interdiction, law enforcement and civil disturbance assistance, blockades and no-fly zones to enforce economic and other sanctions, and humanitarian demining, to name a few.

B. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS

The most important question surrounding the non-traditional mission issue, and the ultimate focus of this thesis, is whether or not the military should be involved in non-traditional missions. To set a proper background context for discussion, the history of non-traditional missions in the U.S. military must be examined. Although the relative importance of non-traditional missions has only come to light because of the end of the Cold War, American armed forces have participated in them since shortly after the birth of the nation.

An interesting sidelight to the principal area of discussion is the changing focus of the U.S. military. As America has grown and continued to evolve, the armed forces have adjusted their missions accordingly. It goes without saying that the relative importance and nature of non-traditional military missions has changed over time as well. These "phases" of the military, to use the terminology of Samuel Huntington, and their affect on both traditional and non-traditional missions will be highlighted and examined throughout the paper.

C. OVERVIEW

Chapter II discusses this idea of phases and changing military focus in greater detail. The names, lengths of time, and natures of the different periods are discussed. This chapter also offers an overview of U.S. military involvement

in non-traditional missions from 1776 until 1973 to illustrate the breadth and importance of these contributions to the country.

The year 1973 was used as a cutoff point for chapter II because it marked the start of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in the American military. Not to be confused with the previously mentioned phases, the AVF, along with the Total Force concept, represents the modern structure and organization of the U.S. armed forces. Chapter III examines the non-traditional mission performance of the AVF in this more recent time period from 1973 until 1989. These actions are presented in more detail because of the added bearing on the discussion of these more recent events.

Chapter IV covers the period from 1989 until the present. The year 1989 is used by many to mark the end of the Cold War. It also signified the beginning of the most recent military phase and brought the issue of non-traditional missions into sharp focus. In addition to looking at actions taken by the military during this period, this chapter also shows non-traditional mission programs that have been implemented since 1989 and current proposals for future activities.

The groundwork laid in the previous chapters serves in Chapter V as the basis for analysis of the different factors affecting the current debate on non-traditional missions. The impact of service-wide and individual soldier philosophies, a changing concept of national security, and readiness and budgetary issues are explored. The relevance of the United States Coast Guard as a military service traditionally tasked with non-traditional missions is also examined. Additionally, the recent history of the formal roles and mission debate and the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (1995) are set forth. The report of this commission could have long-term ramifications for service participation in non-traditional missions. Finally, this chapter illustrates signs

of recent change in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the individual services with respect to these missions.

Conclusions are reached in Chapter VI in an effort to pull together the histories and current issues to show what the "big picture" of non-traditional missions looks like. Recommendations for necessary elements of future non-traditional mission action are provided along with final commentary on the author's position.

D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

An inductive research methodology was used in this thesis. The initial aim was to gather data on historical performance of non-traditional missions in the U.S. military and then generate trends from analyzing this data. Archival research served as the principal tool in this effort. The Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate School was a good source for early military history volumes.

Although non-traditional missions are now an important issue and the subject of much documentation, this was not always true. With the exception of the National Guard, who pride themselves on their tradition of conducting non-traditional missions, discussions of military involvement in these missions were not usually addressed directly. However, government documents such as Congressional hearings and Government Accounting Office reports provided information on more recent armed forces participation. Advanced military school academic research papers also shed light on thoughts about the future direction of armed service missions. Additionally, military history and public affairs offices, principally from the Air Force, Army, and National Guard, furnished good secondary source data for the operational activities of their respective branch of the armed forces.

Telephone interviews with defense agency personnel also provided data for this paper.

After the archival data were collected, analytical research was conducted to determine lessons learned. Results from this phase were used to develop recommendations on the non-traditional mission issues.

E. LIMITATIONS

While attempting to examine a broad topic in considerable detail, the author holds no illusions about all-inclusive coverage of the issues at hand. The historical data were presented in a manner to highlight the long and extensive legacy of non-traditional missions, not to document the history in its entirety. Likewise, the illustrations in Chapters V and VI of the different facets of the present non-traditional missions argument attempt to present an in-depth picture of the various viewpoints, but are not exhaustive treatments of these concerns. Each one of these categories, such as the relationship between non-traditional missions and military readiness or the defense budget, could conceivably support an entire thesis. Still, it is hoped that this thesis offers a well-balanced account of past and present non-traditional missions and proposals along with well-supported recommendations for the future of non-traditional missions in the U.S. military.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW: 1776-1973

A. PHASES OF NATIONAL INTEREST AND AMERICAN MILITARY MISSIONS

Changing American national interests have resulted in corresponding shifts in the nature of American armed force's missions. According to Samuel Huntington, these "shifts" in interest have occurred in 1784, 1815, 1898, 1946, and following the end of the Cold War (Huntington, 1993, p. 38). Huntington's five phases, or shifts, are displayed in Table 1.

Table 1. Major Mission Shifts in U.S. Military, 1776-1995

<u>Beginning of Shift</u>	<u>Focus of Missions</u>
1784	Securing Independence
1815	Westward Expansion, Exploration
1898	"Big War" Military for New World Power
1946	Winning the Cold War
1989	???

Source: Adapted from Samuel Huntington, "New Contingencies, Old Roles," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1993, p. 38.

The armed forces of the United States have also been involved in the performance of non-traditional missions since almost the beginning of the republic. The nature of these non-traditional military missions have mirrored America's changing needs as well. This chapter chronicles some of the numerous examples of these missions from the earliest days of the nation until the start of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973. The information is presented in sections divided by Huntington's aforementioned phases to illustrate the evolution over time. While this body of evidence is hardly all-

inclusive, it is a representative sampling that serves to illustrate a rich and important history of military contributions. See Table 2 below for a summary chronology of non-traditional missions and the U.S. military in this period.

B. SECURING INDEPENDENCE; 1784-1815

The first shift took place during the early days after the Revolutionary War, when the nation needed a military to deal with the threats of Europe (Huntington, 1993) and to deter internal strife as the union consolidated (Matloff, 1969). Perhaps, the earliest non-traditional mission was in late 1786, when militia were used to break up an attack on the Springfield arsenal by rebels led by Daniel Shays. Shays' Rebellion occurred in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War as the nation was struggling to forge the union. (Hassler, 1982)

Another early example of the use of the military in suppressing insurrection revolved around the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794. This show of force was the first time the President had used his authority to employ troops to execute Congressional laws. (Matloff, 1969)

As westward expansion began, new settlers demanded protection against the Indian threat in exchange for their continued loyalty. Their demands contained a warning that they might turn to England or Spain for assistance if the government were unable to meet their needs (Matloff, 1969). During this same period, the size of the U.S. was greatly increased through Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase in 1803. The military was highly involved in exploring the new territories.

Between 1804 and 1806, Captain Meriwether Lewis and William Clark (a former lieutenant in the Army) conducted their famed expedition across the Rocky Mountains and west to the Pacific Ocean. Their efforts located sites for forts to

Table 2. Summary Chronology of Non-Traditional Missions
in U.S. Military, 1784-1973

<u>Year</u>	<u>Non-Traditional Mission</u>
1786	Shay's Rebellion - Civil Insurrection
1794	Whiskey Rebellion - Civil Insurrection
1804-06	Lewis & Clark Expedition - Exploration
1806-07	Capt. Zebulon Pike - Exploration of West
1815-40s	Westward Exploration
1820s	Surgeon General Lovell - Weather Studies
1830s	Capt. Bonneville - Pacific Coast Exploration
1838-42	Lt. Wilkes - Pacific Ocean Exploration
1840s	Mapping of West; Railroad Route Surveys
1842-50s	Matthew Fontaine Maury - Naval Observatory
1852	Commodore Perry - Japan Expedition; Diplomacy
1850s	Navy - Exploration/Survey of Pacific & World
1860s	Union School for Negroes during Civil War
1860s-70s	Reconstruction - Army Administration of South
1867-72	King Survey - Geological Survey/Exploration
1867-77	Alaska - Army Government & Exploration
1870-91	Army Signal Corps - 1st Weather Service
1870s-on	Army Corps of Engineers - River/Harbor Work
1871	Chicago Fire - Disaster Relief
1871-79	Wheeler Survey - Geological Exploration
1870s-90s	Containment of Civil Unrest
1880s-90s	Supervision/Construction of Public Buildings
1894	Pullman Railway - Civil Unrest
1900-38	Boxer Rebellion & Multi-National Garrison
1906	San Francisco Earthquake - Disaster Relief
1907-1914	Supervised Construction of Panama Canal
1907-1914	Found Controls for Malaria & Yellow Fever
1916	Mexican Civil Uprisings - Border Patrol
1919-30s	First Aviation Support for Disaster Relief
1932	Bonus March Incident - Civil Unrest
1930s	Army Support for Various Disaster Relief
1933-42	Civilian Conservation Corps - Youth Program
1934	Army Air Corps - Air Mail Delivery
1948-49	Berlin Airlift - Humanitarian Assistance
1948-on	UNTSO - Middle East Peacekeeping
1949-on	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
1950s	Integration of Blacks into Services
1954	Vietnam - Humanitarian Assistance
1956	Suez Canal - Noncombatant Evacuation
1958	Lebanon Rebellion - Peace Operations
1957-68	U.S. Racial Protests/Rioting - Civil Unrest
1960s-on	Foreign Disaster Relief/Humanitarian Aid
1965	Dominican Republic Rebellion - Peace Ops
1967-71	Vietnam War Protests - Civil Unrest
1970	Postal Mail Strike - Striker Replacement

protect settlers and allow trade with the Indians, and resulted in a large wealth of scientific and geographic information about the new lands. In the years 1806-1807, Captain Zebulon Pike led similar expeditions along the Mississippi, Arkansas, and Red rivers. (Hassler, 1982) As the independence of the U.S. became more secure, national interests focused on the West.

C. WESTWARD EXPANSION AND EXPLORATION; 1815-1898

The second shift started around 1815 and could be termed the westward expansion phase. During this period, the Army was used for fighting Indians and the Navy for protecting trade (Huntington, 1993). The military and the nation were involved in exploring, controlling, and governing the unexplored lands. Considerable time and effort were also expended in examining the world beyond the country's continental boundaries.

Following the end of the War of 1812, exploration and military involvement intensified. During the next three decades, more settlers moved west and the Army went before them, "surveying, fortifying, and building roads." (Matloff, 1969, p. 157) While exploration continued with efforts such as Captain Benjamin L.E. Bonneville's exploration of the Pacific Coast in the 1830s, much of the military effort was aimed at making treaties with the Indians and protecting settlers and trade caravans. (Matloff, 1969)

As a sidelight to these types of non-traditional military efforts, the Army also contributed to meteorological research. Joseph Lovell, the first commissioned Surgeon General, required daily weather reports from all of his medical officers for his attempts to link weather with army diseases. These reports provided the basis for the first study of weather in America. (Matloff, 1969)

During this period, the U.S. Navy often played a part in diplomatic, commerce-building, and scientific research missions. Naval officers or ships were involved in efforts to sign treaties or pacts with Venezuela, Turkey, Cochin China (Vietnam), Siam (Thailand), and Muscat. From 1838-1842, Lieutenant Charles Wilkes led an expedition through the Pacific Ocean that included exploration of Antarctica; the Society, Tuamotu, and Fiji archipelagos; Samoa; the Pacific Northwest; and the Phillipines islands. This survey resulted in a wealth of scientific information that led to the publishing of 24 volumes of material as well as extensive navigational chart information. (Hagan, 1984)

In the 1840s, victory in the war with Mexico allowed the nation to expand further westward. The Army's Corps of Topographical Engineers played a major role in the exploration and mapping of the newly acquired land. While additional forts and roads were built, perhaps the most important contribution during this period was the location of routes for transcontinental railroads. (Matloff, 1969)

Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury used his post as director of the Naval Observatory to foster breakthroughs in the fields of meteorology, hydrography, and maritime technology. He put together the first study in modern oceanography and was an advisor in the positioning of the first transatlantic cable. (Hagan, 1984)

In 1852, Commodore Matthew C. Perry led an expedition to Japan in an effort to facilitate trade and access. Other survey areas in this decade included the Kurile and Aleutian islands, the Rio de la Plata, western coast of Africa, River Jordan, and the Dead Sea. (Hagan, 1984)

During the nation's Civil War, the Union Army became a "school for Negroes." (Eitelberg 1989, p. 4) An estimated 200,000 freedmen and black soldiers were provided basic educational skills by a combination of civilians, chaplains,

Army officers, officer's wives, and enlisted men. Some regard the system developed for this educational effort as a precedent for later schools. (Eitelberg, 1989)

Following the end of the Civil War, the Army became involved in governing occupied areas of the South during the Reconstruction period. The military helped to protect blacks and their white supporters and aided federal marshals in efforts to combat the Ku Klux Klan. The armed forces were also used throughout the nation in domestic disturbances such as strikes, enforcement of local laws, and collection of revenues. A prime example was the Pullman (railway) strike of 1894 where 2,000 troops were used, under Presidential order, to break up a strike. (Matloff, 1969)

During the post-Civil War years, the military was also involved in a number of other domestic activities. After the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, the Army was responsible for most aspects of governing Alaska for ten years. The Army also conducted meteorological observations and supported exploration of Alaska. In the continental U.S., the Army Signal Corps organized and operated the nation's first modern weather service between 1870 and 1891 (Matloff, 1969). The armed forces assisted in controlling the Chicago Fire of 1871 in one of the earliest instances of military participation in major domestic disaster relief (Stoll, 1994).

The Corps of Engineers conducted work on the nation's rivers and harbors to develop water resources. They were involved in the construction of public buildings such as the Washington Monument, the building that became the Library of Congress, and the State, War, and Navy buildings (Matloff, 1969). Work was also done on the aqueduct and Capitol building in Washington, D.C. (Hassler, 1982). Additionally, the Corps of Engineers were responsible for both the King and Wheeler Surveys, which provided much scientific information about the lands along the 40th parallel and west of the 100th

meridian, respectively (Matloff, 1969). During the latter part of this expansion and exploration period, the U.S. began to emerge as a world power. (Matloff, 1969)

D. A MILITARY FOR A NEW WORLD POWER; 1898-1946

The third shift commenced in approximately 1898, in step with growing U.S. industrialization and rising prominence on the world scene. America began to build a military suited for "big battles" and "big wars" (Huntington, 1993, p. 38). This phase involved protection of U.S. interests around the world and continued through the two world wars (Matloff, 1969).

A number of Navy-led interoceanic canal surveys were conducted as the nation's interests expanded further beyond its land borders (Hagan, 1984). After participation in a multi-national force in 1900 to end China's Boxer Rebellion, American troops remained in China until 1938 to provide a garrison for the Tientsin-Peking railway. The Army was called upon to supervise the building of the Panama Canal (1907-1914) after the congressionally-appointed Isthmian Canal Commission told the President that a project of such magnitude was beyond the capabilities of private U.S. industry. During the construction of the canal, the Army Medical Department was instrumental in finding controls for malaria and yellow fever. (Matloff, 1969)

In the aftermath of the great San Francisco earthquake of 1906, the Army initially provided troops to guard the banking district, prevent looting, and assist in putting out the massive fires. The Army also provided food, clothing, and shelter to many. Eleven days after the earthquake had struck, the Army was placed in charge of the entire relief effort. For the next month and a half, military personnel built temporary barracks, administered refugee camps, and provided medical care, food, and sanitation for a city where the

devastation was so great that more than 350,000 people were homeless. (Harrison, 1992)

In 1916, 75,000 National Guardsmen were called into federal service by President Wilson to help guard the U.S./Mexican border during Mexican civil uprisings led by Pancho Villa. Following the end of World War I, active Army troops were again used to help police the Mexican border because of revolutionary activity in Mexico. Around this time, Army personnel also helped quiet domestic disturbances in the U.S. brought about by labor and race-related problems. (Matloff, 1969)

In 1919, the nation's military aviation services first became involved in non-traditional missions as food and supplies were air-dropped to flood victims in Texas. Flood relief missions were later flown in Ohio and Colorado as well. Army pilots also flew fire-watch missions for the U.S. Forest Service, conducted mapping missions for the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, utilized bombs to break ice on the Delaware and Platte Rivers, and airlifted rescue workers to mine disasters in Colorado and California. (Callander, 1993)

Amidst the backdrop of the Great Depression, the Army helped break up a gathering in Washington D.C. during 1932's Bonus March incident. Eleven-thousand service veterans and their families had grouped in front of the Capitol and in a nearby shantytown while demanding payment for service in World War I. While the Army performed this task well, the use of the military against civilians and veterans served to soil the service's image. Nevertheless, the Army was utilized in "a variety of nonmilitary tasks that only [they] had the resources and the organization to tackle quickly." (Matloff, 1969, p. 413) These tasks included assistance in the aftermath of blizzards, floods, and hurricanes. The Corps of Engineers also increased their work on waterways to improve navigation and flood control. (Matloff, 1969)

An enormous non-traditional undertaking in this era was military responsibility for administration of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). President Roosevelt directed the Departments of War, Labor, Agriculture, and the Interior to conduct a program that put jobless young men into conservation work such as reforestation. The Army was responsible for rapid mobilization of the project and also managed the camps and provided for CCC enrollee welfare. In an effort that lasted from early 1933 until June 1942, the Army first utilized regular troops and later reserves to manage and train approximately three million American men. The CCC was viewed favorably by the public and regarded as a landmark social action success that influenced youth employment measures years later. (Sherraden, 1981)

In 1934, the Army Air Corps carried air mail for three months while suspected fraudulent commercial contracts were renegotiated. This effort was eventually labeled a "fiasco" because of high operating costs and losses of men and equipment. However, it may have led to higher budgets and better instrument training for military pilots at the time, and it stands as an interesting example of military involvement in a non-traditional activity. (Callander, 1993)

E. THE COLD WAR; 1946-1973

The next shift occurred about 1946 with the beginning of the Cold War (Huntington, 1993). America and the Soviet Union survived World War II as the world's two remaining superpowers. As each developed more and more powerful nuclear weapons, U.S. policy was aimed at containing Soviet expansion. Military forces of the U.S. were built and maintained with the capability to wage both conventional and nuclear war while striving to promote democracy worldwide.

An early manifestation of the Cold War was the Soviet move in 1948 to cut off West Berlin from the rest of Germany occupied by the Western allies. In response, the U.S. Air Force provided the majority of the support for what became known as the "Berlin Airlift." The resupply operation lasted over a year and involved almost 278,000 flights to bring more than two million pounds of food, fuel, and other goods into West Berlin. (Callander, 1993)

Also in 1948, the United Nations established the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to supervise a cease-fire between Israel and neighboring Arab nations (Evans, 1987). U.S. personnel served, and continue to serve, in this operation, which could be described as a precursor for the more recent American involvement in peacekeeping and peace operations.

Efforts to promote democracy worldwide were strengthened in 1949 with the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. As a result, military equipment and training assistance were provided to Greece, Turkey, Iran, China, Korea, the Phillipines, and a number of Latin American nations. (Matloff, 1969) The U.S. continues to provide military assistance programs to this day.

In this phase of the U.S. military, the armed forces also served as a major agent of social change. In 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 981, directing "equality of treatment and opportunity" in the armed forces. The full integration of blacks into the military was a direct result of Truman's order. It predated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by more than ten years in attempting to demonstrate racial equality in the United States. (Eitelberg, 1989)

In the 1950s, the Army Corps of Engineers performed a major role in the planning, design, and construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway (Becker, 1984). The Navy provided sealift support to the French in 1954 in Vietnam. A large number of

political refugees, cargo, and vehicles were transported from communist North Vietnam to the south following the French defeat. The Navy and Marines were also involved in the evacuation of 1,500 U.S. civilians from Egypt during the 1956 Suez Canal incident. (Hagan, 1984)

Army, Navy, and Marine forces responded to a Lebanese request for U.S. assistance in 1958. These forces helped to quell a rebellion and stabilize the situation before withdrawing. A similar action took place during a military revolt in the Dominican Republic in 1965. Army and Marine soldiers were landed to protect U.S. nationals and prevent Communist expansion. During the 16 months the U.S. military forces were in the Dominican Republic, the troops maintained law and order, and distributed food and supplies. (Matloff, 1969)

As the U.S. Air Force grew and developed, it continued to provide humanitarian assistance worldwide. Examples during the 1960s included flights to provide support after flooding in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Tunisia, and Fairbanks, Alaska; food and supplies following an earthquake in Sicily; food to Ecuador during a severe drought; and evacuation of people from Costa Rica endangered by a volcanic eruption. The Air Force also worked with the Public Health Service to combat an encephalitis epidemic in Central America. (Callander, 1993)

The late 1950s through the early 1970s were a period marked by civil unrest within America. The earlier discord revolved around racial problems, while later activity was largely related to protests against American involvement in the war in Vietnam. In 1957, President Eisenhower used Army and Arkansas National Guard troops to uphold a court order allowing nine black students to attend a high school in Little Rock. The troops broke up a mob and protected the students. Regular Army and federalized Guard personnel were also used to

control racially-motivated incidents in Mississippi in 1962 and in Alabama in 1963 and 1965. (Matloff, 1969)

Over 13,000 California National Guardsmen were used to help restore order during the Watts riots in 1965. Both regular Army soldiers and Michigan National Guardsmen were utilized to quell the Detroit riot of 1967. Rioting and mob action occurred across the nation following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in 1968. In response, the National Guard was called out in a number of states. Federal troops as well were needed to help control the situations in Chicago, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. (Matloff, 1969)

During 1967-1971, Federal and National Guard soldiers were positioned to monitor anti-war demonstrations in the nation's capitol and elsewhere. Among the most widely known of these efforts was the infamous tragedy at Kent State University, where four demonstrators were killed and a dozen wounded. In 1970, over 18,000 Army National Guard and Reserve personnel were called into federal service to assist postal authorities for several weeks because of a mail strike that had originated in New York City. In 1971, over 10,000 National Guardsmen, Marines, and Regular Army troops were used in Washington D.C. to guard highways and bridges and to keep traffic moving on May Day. Their efforts thwarted attempts by youthful demonstrators to prevent government employees from getting to work. (Matloff, 1969)

The Vietnam War ended shortly after these last events. In the aftermath of the war and the end of the national draft, the U.S. armed forces became an All-Volunteer Force. The history of non-traditional missions performed by the American military and the Cold War phase of the American military continue in Chapter III (Huntington's "fifth phase" is examined in Chapter IV).

III. EXPERIENCES SINCE THE END OF THE DRAFT, 1973-1989

In 1973, the end of the national draft ushered in the all-volunteer military in the United States. However, while the advent of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) brought about enormous change in the services, it did not, in and of itself, cause a shift in the national interests or focus of the military. The country and the armed forces continued about their business of winning the Cold War; however, non-traditional missions remained a part of the U.S. military's daily regimen. For example, in just the 1980s, the Air Force performed more than 60 disaster relief, humanitarian, or rescue missions in 49 different countries (Department of the Air Force, 1990).

This chapter details the history of non-traditional military missions in the transitory period between the birth of the AVF and the end of the Cold War in 1989. Although Chapter II is organized chronologically because of the sheer volume and diversity of the non-traditional missions involved, this chapter is organized by mission area to focus more directly on the important undertakings of the AVF. A summary chronology of non-traditional missions conducted by the military between 1973 and 1989 are listed in Table 3 below.

A. LAW ENFORCEMENT

1. The Drug War

The military has played a role in America's "War on Drugs" since the 1960s (U.S. Congress, House 1990). Initially, this role had largely been providing shipping surveillance reports to other law enforcement agencies (U.S. Congress, Senate 1986). However, in the 1980s, under the

Table 3. Summary Chronology of Non-Traditional Missions
in U.S. Military, 1973-1989

<u>Year</u>	<u>Non-Traditional Mission</u>
1973-81	National Guard frequent public sector strike replacements
1973-on	National Guard support for domestic disaster relief
1973-on	UNTSO - U.N.-led Middle East peacekeeping operation
1973-on	Foreign disaster relief / humanitarian aid
1973	Flood relief to Pakistan
1974	Provided support after Jonestown cult mass suicide
1974	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation in Cyprus
1975-88	Army civil-military community support program
1975	Flood relief to Romania
1975	Earthquake relief to Guatemala City
1976	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation in Lebanon
1976	Earthquake relief to Turkey
1977	Extensive snow removal assistance in New York
1978-79	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation in Iran
1980	Supported other agencies in Mariel Boatlift response
1980	Earthquake relief to Algeria
1980-on	MFO - U.S.-led peacekeeping operation in the Sinai Desert
1980	Assisted in roof-top evacuation at Las Vegas MGM hotel fire
1981	Replace striking air traffic controllers
1982-on	Increased participation in War on Drugs
1982-84	MNF - U.S.-led peacekeeping operation in Lebanon
1983-on	Humanitarian & Civic Assistance program in Central America
1984	National Guard support for Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games
1985-on	Navy Personnel Excellence Partnership civil-military program
1985-on	Humanitarian Assistance Program: excess property and aid
1985-on	Denton Program: space available transport of relief supplies
1988	Earthquake relief to Armenia
1988	Army & USMC units help fight Yellowstone National Park fires

direction of President Reagan, the participation of the armed forces was greatly expanded.

The Defense Authorization Act of 1982 was aimed at clarifying the types of assistance that the military could provide in the Drug War and added sections to Title 10 of the United States Code (USC). Sections 371, 372, and 372 were added to allow the military to work with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies through sharing information, use of equipment and facilities, and training of law enforcement personnel. Although these proceedings were

previously legal, the legislation was passed to avoid possible conflict with interpretations of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prevents the use of federal troops in enforcing civilian laws. (U.S. Congress, House 1990)

Additionally, section 374 provided an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act that allowed the military to assist, operate and maintain loaned equipment under certain restricted conditions (i.e., the conduct of operations directed at criminal violations of federal drug and immigration laws, particularly those related to air and sea traffic). Section 375 served to reaffirm the Posse Comitatus Act by ensuring that the military assistance did not involve direct participation in any search, seizure, arrest, or interdiction. (U.S. Congress, House 1990)

As a result of these measures, DOD played a more active role in the Drug War. The greatest amount of military support involved aerial surveillance. For example, in fiscal 1985 alone, military aircraft such as Air Force AWACS, Marine Corps OV-10s, and Navy P-3s, S-3s, and E-2s flew more than 3,000 sorties and 10,000 flight hours to assist law enforcement agencies. Also in 1985, the armed forces answered almost 8,000 assistance requests for facility use, equipment loans, explosives disposal, security and training assistance, and other mission support. The Navy provided ship deployment days for embarked U.S. Coast Guard tactical law enforcement teams to engage in boardings of suspected drug traffickers. The Air Force operated two aerostat radar sites in Florida to track airborne drug traffickers. The National Guard aided the civilian authorities of 14 states in 1984 and 20 states in 1985. The 1985 National Guard efforts resulted in the eradication of nearly 200,000 marijuana plants worth more than \$260 million. Between passage of the new legislation in 1982 and mid-1986, the military had loaned more than \$111 million

in equipment to agencies for enforcement of drug laws. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1986)

In fiscal 1987, the armed forces reported expenditures of \$389 million for drug law enforcement assistance (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-45). In fiscal 1988, DOD assets flew an estimated 28,000 aerial surveillance flight hours and contributed over 2,000 ship days to support of the Coast Guard (GAO 1991, NSIAD-91-117).

Despite the apparent amount and growth of military involvement, officials in Congress were not completely pleased. During a Senate hearing in July 1986, Senator Alfonse D'Amato, a member of the Committee on Appropriations, stated:

Mr. Chairman, they are hiding behind the posse comitatus. It comes down to Secretary Weinberger and some of the admirals and generals and the Navy and the Air Force who do not like the mission of fighting drugs. They do not want it . . .

. . . If we are going to do something effectively the military must be involved in utilizing its resources and coordinating them. Instead, they have done everything they can to duck out, and their big claim is look at this, look at the assets we made available. Of course, they did not make them available. The Congress ordered they be made available. They were brought kicking and screaming to do what little they've done.

What we have is society saying we have a total commitment to battle drugs and we have the military saying, well, we do not want to do that for a whole variety of reasons, including posse comitatus as one of the reasons. (U.S. Congress, Senate 1986, p.43)

As some questioned the commitment of DOD, others were concerned about the extent of growing military involvement. During 1988 Congressional hearings, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services questioned how the "new role [would] affect military readiness and current military operations" (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220, p. 13), and the ranking minority committee member wanted to ensure that military

assistance would not "denigrate the Department's [DOD] primary role, namely, of providing for our national defense." (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220, p. 13) Also, the Secretary of Defense was concerned about "inefficiency and degraded readiness that could result from an expanded military role." (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220, p. 13)

Passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and established a cabinet-level position for the ONDCP's director (U.S. Congress, House 1990). While this move was ample evidence of the seriousness with which the nation regarded the War on Drugs, a consensus on military participation had not been reached when the Cold War ended. The role of American armed forces in the Drug War underwent a substantial change in 1989. These changes, the after-effects, and current developments are discussed in Chapter IV.

2. The Cuban Boatlift

Between April and September 1980, approximately 125,000 Cubans left their country for the U.S. by small boat in what has become known as the Cuban or Mariel Boatlift. Most of these people were refugees fleeing a repressive Communist government; however, others were criminals. Castro apparently used the opportunity to rid himself and the country of felons. (Parker, 1993)

Many vessels used in the boatlift were small and overloaded with refugees. What would normally have been seen as a law enforcement operation involving illegal immigration quickly became a humanitarian mission to prevent loss of life. The U.S. Coast Guard attempted to provide the necessary humanitarian support, but did not have enough assets to perform the job adequately. As a result, the Navy became involved and five Navy ships patrolled the Northern area of

the waters between Cuba and Florida to help prevent unnecessary deaths. (Parker, 1993)

Additionally, after arrival of some Cuban Boatlift refugees in the U.S., Air Force units were used to transport them to various processing centers around the country (Military Airlift Command Office of History, 1991). The Navy participation was a precursor for involvement in Haitian and Cuban immigration operations in the 1990s.

B. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

1. Civil Disturbances

a. Public Sector Labor Disputes

President Nixon's use of federal troops in the 1970 postal strike set a modern precedent for military involvement in public sector labor strikes. Although the armed forces have a long history of participation in breaking strikes and even in replacing striking employees when the workers were engaged in defense-related activities, the military had only been used once before (in the 1919 Boston police strike) to replace public-sector workers. (Jacobs, 1982)

In 1971, National Guardsmen were used once for state purposes to replace firefighters, but between 1973 and 1981 military units were called up 45 times. Over the course of the nation's history, several legislative restraints have been placed on the use of the military in domestic circumstances. A primary example is the previously-mentioned Posse Comitatus Act. (Jacobs, 1982)

Perhaps the combination of Nixon's broadening of executive power with increased availability of soldiers following the end of the Vietnam War led to the upsurge of this "new" role. Although an examination of the legality or

reasons behind this usage of military personnel is outside the scope of this paper, the 1973-1989 time period did result in significant increases in the involvement of the military as replacements for striking public employees.

Federal troops were used only once in the 45 replacement episodes during the air traffic controller strike in 1981. All of the other incidents involved state use of National Guard personnel. Many states allow governors to call out the Guard for a broadly defined "emergency," which probably accounts for the large federal-state difference. (Jacobs, 1982)

The Guardsmen were used to replace city and state employees, mental health and hospital workers, prison guards, police, and firefighters, among others. While some of the replacement work (such as the medical situations and prisons) required some specific on-the-job training, the troops were already relatively well-trained for the police work. Performance by the National Guard in these replacement actions was reported as mostly satisfactory, even in the more dangerous situations like firefighting. The same is true for public reaction to the Guard's involvement. (Jacobs, 1982)

The use of the National Guard to replace striking public sector employees dwindled in the latter stages of this period. This may have been the result of tighter state budgets that reduced the likelihood that the Guard would be called up (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1982), increased public awareness of this use of the Guard, or changes in labor practices. Whatever the reason for the decline, striker replacement was an important National Guard non-traditional mission, and the potential for its use remains.

b. Other Civil Disturbances

The National Guard and other military units were also used throughout the 1973-1989 period to support state and local governments in dealing with, what the National Guard terms, "other civil disturbances." These disturbances included civil unrest, demonstrations, strikes, blockades, prison disorders, and a variety of assistance to law enforcement. Use of the National Guard for these purposes is detailed in Appendix A.

In fiscal 1974, for example, the National Guard was used extensively to control disturbances related to trucker strikes and blockades across the nation (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1974). In fiscal 1981, plans and units were prepared for a threatened national postal strike (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1981). Fiscal 1982 support included operations monitoring anti-nuclear demonstrations against nuclear power plants and laboratories (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1982).

To provide support to civil authorities at the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles, almost a thousand Guardsmen were activated for aviation and logistics missions (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1982).

2. Civil-Military Programs

In the 1973-1989 period, both the Army and the Navy launched minor initiatives authorizing the use of military personnel and resources for support of local civilian communities. The Army Domestic Action program was initiated in 1975 by Secretary "Bo" Callaway and put forth under Army Regulation 28-19 (Nunn, 1993). The Navy began its Personal Excellence Partnership program in 1985 (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995).

The Army program was a decentralized effort and allowed local military commanders to assist their communities through actions such as repair of recreation facilities and supervision of summer programs for disadvantaged youths. Top Army leadership failed to push and support the program strongly enough and the regulation governing the program was terminated in 1988 after interest had faded (Nunn, 1993). However, some individual base activities were continued and remain to this day (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995).

The Navy program was aimed at helping to "educate America's youth in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship." (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995, p. 2) Navy volunteers provide assistance through coaching, mentoring, and support of health and science fairs and environmental and other community efforts (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995). The program is still actively supported by the Navy and, as of 1993, six of the Navy projects had been recognized in the Presidential "Daily Points of Light" program (Nunn, 1993).

3. Disaster Relief

a. Background

Chapter II mentions several examples of military assistance in the wake of domestic disasters. In providing domestic disaster relief, the armed forces seek to assist local communities until state and local agencies can sustain their own relief efforts (Stoll, 1994). The role and nature of military assistance has evolved over time.

In 1947, Congress passed legislation allowing the President to make surplus wartime supplies available to states and local governments during disasters. The Federal Disaster

Act of 1950 (Public Law 875) further authorized the President to use all departments of the Government to give assistance after the occurrence of a major natural disaster. Additional legislation was enacted in 1966 following the Alaskan earthquake of 1964 and flooding in the Midwestern U.S. (Harrison, 1992)

After approval of the Comprehensive Disaster Relief Act of 1970, DOD generated a directive (3025.1) outlining policy for the "Use of Military Resources During Natural Disaster Emergencies within the United States, its Territories, and Possessions." Policy guidelines stipulated that military participation should not interfere with the primary defense mission nor involve personnel in law enforcement action that could violate the Posse Comitatus Act. Additionally, military personnel were required to remain under military command, and military resources could not be acquired or kept specifically for domestic disaster relief. (Harrison, 1992)

In 1973, the Secretary of the Army was designated as the Executive Agent for coordinating military support to civil emergencies. These duties are fulfilled by the Director of Military Support (DOMS) in Washington, D.C. (Harrison, 1992)

The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-288) was passed to better structure agency responsibilities during disasters and national emergencies. It directed federal and state organizations to plan and coordinate disaster response actions. However, the fact that different federal agencies were responsible for different types of disaster relief was a continuing cause of confusion. This led to the creation in 1978 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (Stoll, 1994)

FEMA became responsible for the coordination of inter-departmental and inter-agency disaster relief response, yet it was still hampered by a lack of authority over

organizations that regarded the emergency relief mission as secondary to their real purposes (Stoll, 1994). However, FEMA efforts eventually led in 1987 to a "Plan for Federal Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake" that had been approved by the 28 federal agencies involved (Harrison, 1992). Federal Response was divided into 12 separate functions, and agencies were designated with lead or support roles. DOD was named the lead agency for two functions (urban search and rescue, public works and engineering) and a support agency for the remaining ten (Stoll, 1994).

In 1988, Public Law 93-288 was amended by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). The Stafford Act authorized the federal government to respond to disasters to save lives and property and protect public health and safety. It gave the President the power to direct any federal agency to provide support to state and local agencies in times of emergency and disaster. If a major disaster is declared, the state is required to share up to 25 percent of the cost of federal assistance. FEMA is the designated lead agency with the direction to carry out the Stafford Act. (Stoll, 1994)

b. Military Disaster Response

The military continued its pattern and record of domestic emergency assistance during this period. While support varied from year to year because of need, states activated the National Guard annually to provide relief in the aftermath of floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, wind and ice storms, forest fires, chemical spills, power outages, and other natural and manmade disasters. See Appendix A for an illustration of the magnitude of the National Guard response.

In addition to major disasters, the National Guard was also used to provide assistance for smaller or more

unusual contingencies. In fiscal 1981, the Guard assisted the state of California in efforts to eradicate the Med-fly menace to the state's fruit crop industry (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1981). Regular DOD forces were involved in a highly unusual and tragic "domestic" emergency in 1974. After the mass suicide of Reverend Jim Jones and the over 900 members of his Jonestown colony, the Air Force transported Air Force, Army, and FBI personnel to and from the scene in Guyana. A total of 915 bodies were recovered, identified, and flown back to the U.S. (Lempert and others, 1992)

Of course, the active-duty military also provided support after emergencies and large natural catastrophes. In 1977, Air Force aircraft flew rescue teams and equipment to Kentucky following a coal mine disaster. After an enormous snowfall in Buffalo, New York in February 1977, the Air Force flew 48 missions to carry almost 1,000 tons of equipment and 500 people to the area to assist in snow removal efforts. The Air Force also supported the Nuclear Regulatory Agency by transporting men and material to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in the wake of the Three-Mile Island nuclear power plant malfunctions in 1979. (Military Airlift Command Office of History, 1991)

Air Force helicopters assisted civil efforts to evacuate people from the Las Vegas MGM Grand Hotel in 1980. Over 100 individuals were either hoisted from balconies or taken from the roof during this mission (Lempert and others, 1992). In fiscal 1983, military personnel responded to Hawaii's first major hurricane in 23 years and California's most devastating earthquake since 1906 (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1983).

In 1988, the Air Force provided the equivalent of 68 C-141 transport aircraft cargo loads of personnel and equipment to support actions to put out forest fires in the continental U.S. (Department of the Air Force, 1990).

Additionally, two Army and two Marine Corps battalions assisted efforts to combat fires that year in Yellowstone National Park, and two other Army battalions aided fire-fighting efforts in the Lewis and Clark National Forest (Kelly, 1992).

C. PEACE OPERATIONS

1. Peacekeeping

The United States had two new experiences with peacekeeping in this period. These were the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula and the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon.

After the cease-fire that ended the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, five years elapsed before any substantial movement toward a treaty occurred. President Jimmy Carter worked with Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat and Israeli leader Menachem Begin in 1978 to derive the Camp David Accords. A formal peace treaty followed in 1979. In addition to an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula, the treaty called for United Nations observers to monitor the area. When the U.N. declined to provide a peacekeeping force, the U.S., with the approval of Egypt and Israel, created the MFO. The eleven nations participating in the MFO were Australia, New Zealand, Colombia, Fiji, France, Italy, Holland, England, Uruguay, Norway, and the U.S. (Williams, 1985)

U.S. military personnel comprised the largest segment of the MFO with over 1,000 Americans among the 2,600 members of the force. An infantry battalion of up to 800 soldiers from either the 82nd or 101st Airborne Divisions was included in the U.S. detail along with medical and logistics personnel (Williams, 1985). The mission of the American peacekeeping detachment and the MFO was to "observe, report and verify, and

have a military presence" in conjunction with the terms of the peace treaty (Williams, 1985, p. 11).

The MFO is an example of the use of peacekeeping "to supplement and reinforce a peace treaty" (Evans, 1987). This peacekeeping operation continues. Perhaps, because the treaty has been supported by both the Egyptians and the Israelis, the MFO has enjoyed a lifetime free from major incidents.

The Multi-National Force existed in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984, and was composed of members from France, Italy, England, and the U.S. (Evans, 1987). The MNF was created and sent into Beirut after massacres at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in September 1982 (Evans, 1993). While initially intended as a "humanitarian" peacekeeping operation to prevent further violence against Palestinians (Evans, 1993) and to separate the opposing sides in a civil war (Evans, 1987), the mission evolved to assisting the Lebanese government attempt to regain control of the country (Evans, 1993).

The American contingent of the MNF consisted of roughly 1,800 Marines and sailors from a Marine Amphibious Unit (Gaddo, 1984). Although the MNF had enjoyed support from all sides in Beirut, the changed purpose of the peacekeeping mission was seen by the non-government factions as taking sides in the struggle (Evans, 1993). Conditions in Lebanon became more violent as U.S. forces and positions came under attack and eventually responded in kind. The situation culminated in the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut and the deaths of 245 sailors and marines (Gaddo, 1984). The situation in Lebanon continued to deteriorate and American Embassy personnel and citizens were evacuated in February 1984 as the U.S. withdrew its peacekeeping force (Younghouse and Haligan, 1984). The loss of neutrality is seen by some analysts as the primary reason for the failure of the MNF, since the Americans and other

members were no longer seen as impartial observers (Graham, 1993).

2. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

During periods of strife overseas, U.S. military forces are often used to evacuate U.S. citizens, both government and regular civilian, from possible harm and exposure to combat. In the military vernacular, these types of missions are called Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs).

In 1974, U.S. civilians were evacuated from Cyprus by American naval forces during a period of conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriot elements. In 1976, U.S. Navy helicopters flew nearly 250 Americans and Europeans out of Lebanon while Lebanese factions were engaged in hostilities (Collier, 1989). Prior to the revolt against the Shah in Iran, the Air Force brought nearly 900 Americans out of Tehran during December 1978 (Military Airlift Command Office of History, 1991). In the aftermath of the revolt, Navy personnel evacuated 440 people from the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Char Bahar in February 1979 (Hagan, 1984).

D. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FOREIGN)

1. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program

The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program is authorized under section 401 of Title 10, USC. This program allows DOD to engage in "State Department-approved humanitarian and civic assistance activities in conjunction with authorized military operations." (Irvin, 1994, p. 2) The assistance is restricted to actions that use the operational skills of the forces involved, are not military-related, do not duplicate other assistance efforts, and are in the

interests of both the U.S. and the host country (Hogberg and Stone, 1993).

From 1973 to 1989, the armed forces often performed training abroad and provided aid and assistance to foreign nations in the process. For example, between 1983 and 1987, more than 24,000 Army and Air National Guard members participated in training in Panama and Honduras. In addition to more traditional jungle-warfare, artillery, armor, airlift, and air defense training, their activities included road-building and medical, civil engineering, and civil affairs training exercises. (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195)

Between 1983 and 1987, Army Guardsmen and other U.S. forces participated in medical and construction projects such as building and improving airstrips and other facilities during joint-Honduran exercises known as AHUAS TARA I, II, and III. Approximately 3,500 National Guard personnel helped repair and construct 20 kilometers of road in Honduras as part of BLAZING TRAILS 1986. In BLAZING TRAILS 1987, Guardsmen conducting logistics and public affairs training supported Army Reserve personnel building a 5.5 kilometer road in Honduras. (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195)

In Panama, 778 Guardsmen built a 15 kilometer road as part of exercise MINUTEMAN I during 1984. The next year 5,418 Guardsmen were involved in BLAZING TRAILS 1985 where the 15 kilometer road was repaired and a new 27 kilometer road constructed. Army Guardsmen supported Army Reserve personnel in the building of a 20 kilometer road as part of BLAZING TRAILS 1986. Also, more than 6,000 National Guard members were involved in medical readiness, public affairs, and other training during these years. (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195)

Additionally, 814 Air National Guard personnel from "prime beef" units conducted construction, electronics, and plumbing training exercises in either Panama or Honduras over this same period. Over 5,000 Air National Guardsmen

participated in VOLANT OAK training that included disaster relief, search and rescue, and transport of medical assistance teams among their defense missions. (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195)

These missions "provided economic development assistance to Honduras and Panama." (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195, p. 11) According to Joseph E. Kelley (Associate Director of GAO's National Security and International Affairs Division), "The National Guard has benefited Honduras and Panama through its exercises, principally by constructing roads. . . . In addition, Guard units have provided medical treatment, improved school buildings, and participated in other humanitarian assistance activities." (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195, p. 2) Moreover, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau stated

the opportunities to expand training into Central America have greatly benefited the Guard's capabilities to plan for, mobilize, and conduct operations in a tropical or subtropical environment. . . . Such overseas locations provide additional opportunities to conduct essential training for engineering and logistics, communications, infantry, field artillery, armor, aviation, and special forces personnel." (GAO 1988, NSIAD-88-195, p. 10)

These involvements of U.S. armed forces exemplify the military performing non-traditional missions that provide a "non-combat" benefit while supporting readiness and training.

2. Humanitarian Assistance Program

The Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), also known as the Excess Property Program, was established in 1985 (Hogberg and Stone, 1993) under sections 2547 and 2551 of Title 10 U.S. Code. Section 2547 authorizes the donation of excess, nonlethal DOD supplies to foreign countries through the Department of State. Section 2551 allows funding for

transportation of foreign humanitarian relief and other purposes. (Irvin, 1994)

The HAP was instituted to enable the U.S. to provide equipment to Afghan rebels and resistance groups. The first shipment of supplies was flown into Afghanistan in March 1986. Equipment was sent to Cambodia in 1987, and numerous other countries have since been provided assistance. Typically, U.S. embassies receive requests for materiel, and then the Department of State processes the requests before delivering them to DOD. Next, the military transports the supplies and equipment worldwide for transfer to a State Department official and the requesting country (Hogberg and Stone, 1993). Military units and personnel gain experience by operating in new and different locales.

Examples of excess property provided by the U.S. armed services include vehicles, furniture, clothing, tools, and medical and construction equipment and supplies. The property is provided in "as is" condition without guarantees or additional support (Irvin, 1994). An estimated \$49 million of DOD equipment was donated through the HAP between 1986 and 1989 (U.S. Congress, House 1990). The HAP enables the military to promote democracy promotion goals while providing its own members operational training in overseas areas.

3. The Denton Program

The Denton Program is named for former Senator Jeremiah Denton and was established in 1985 under section 402 of Title 10, USC. The program permits DOD to transport privately donated humanitarian supplies to foreign countries on a no-cost, space-available basis. (Irvin, 1994)

Management of the Denton Program usually included the Department of State and the Agency for International Development (AID) along with DOD (Hogberg and Stone, 1993).

In the first six years of the program, the U.S. Air Force had two officers assigned to help manage the program and an average of "a couple million pounds per year" of goods were transported (Rourke, 1995).

4. Foreign Disaster Relief and Assistance

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 brought about the Foreign Disaster Assistance Program. Under this program, AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) may request DOD assets for foreign disaster relief. The disasters may be the results of both natural events, such as hurricanes, flooding and earthquakes, or manmade occurrences, such as accidents or warfare. (Hogberg and Stone, 1993)

U.S. military forces participated in disaster relief efforts in Pakistan in 1973 following flooding which killed more than 400 people and affected four million. DOD also assisted Romania in 1975 after a flood impacted over one million people (Irvin, 1994). Supplies were flown to Guatemala City in 1975 and Turkey in 1976 subsequent to earthquakes in those respective countries (Military Airlift Command Office of History, 1991).

In October 1980, Algeria was struck by two devastating earthquakes. The U.S. Air Force responded within 36 hours and delivered a total of 340 tons of relief supplies. This U.S. military force action "strengthened international bonds" that later led to Algeria taking the lead role in mediation efforts that brought about the release of American hostages from Iran. (Department of the Air Force, 1990, p. 14)

Between 1984 and 1989, DOD responded to 42 requests for disaster relief assistance from OFDA. DOD action helped 28 countries worldwide including Chile, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Jamaica, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Armenia, Pakistan, Korea, and the Phillipines. The disasters ranged from floods,

earthquakes, hurricanes, and volcanic eruptions to famine, plane crashes, explosions, and civil strife (Hogberg and Stone, 1993). An overview of Air Force support to these and other non-traditional missions during this period can be found in Appendix B.

Support for these missions totaled more than \$6 million and included personnel along with food, medical supplies, communications and other equipment, blankets, cots and tents. Medical, engineering, and search-and-rescue teams were among the manpower assistance (Hogberg and Stone, 1993). Statistics for the Air Force airlift after the 1988 earthquake in Armenia help provide a perspective of the extent of support and great distances often involved in U.S. aid supported by the military. In this one operation, 513 tons of relief supplies and more than 200 people were transported to an area almost 10,000 kilometers from the continental U.S. (Lempert and others, 1992)

In summary, the period from 1973 until 1989 was a time of active U.S. military involvement in non-traditional missions. Although the armed forces did participate to a greater degree in law enforcement activities than the military had done in the recent past, the first 16 years of the All-Volunteer Force were, with respect to non-traditional missions, principally business as usual.

However, the non-traditional mission tempo did accelerate somewhat in the last few years before 1989 with the combination of greater attention to domestic concerns and programs promoting democracy abroad. Perhaps these actions were in response to signs of a changing world and the impending collapse of the Communist bloc. The ramifications of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the ensuing end of the Cold War on America, the U.S. military, and non-traditional missions are discussed in the next chapter.

IV. INITIATIVES AND DIRECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND CURRENT ALTERNATIVE MISSION PROPOSALS

In Chapter II, reference is made to Samuel Huntington's discussion of changes in the U.S. military's missions. Huntington alluded to the end of the Cold War as a precursor for a "fifth phase of American defense policy." (Huntington, 1993, p. 38) For the purposes of this paper, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 will serve as a point to mark both the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new phase.

Since 1989, the future direction of the U.S. military has been a topic of considerable debate. However, a clear label for the military focus of this phase has yet to emerge. This chapter examines the broad and growing range of non-traditional missions that have suddenly become more important as the new phase continues to evolve. A summary chronology of non-traditional missions conducted by the military between 1989 and the present can be found in Table 4 below.

A. SETTING THE STAGE

In a February 1993 presentation, Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, clearly and succinctly stated the situation facing America's military after the end of the Cold War:

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union give us a chance to make significant reductions in the size of our military forces and our defense budget. . . . But tremors of instability and outright regional conflict are continuing to shake many parts of the globe. These volatile situations, coupled with the changing nature of the world's balance of power, mean that we must still maintain a strong, and perhaps, even more flexible military force.

Over the next few years, the nation will continue the debate over what size the base force should be, what roles and missions it should undertake, and how it should be structured. There is considerable uncertainty at this time on just what kind of a military capability we will need in the future and what size force will be adequate.

We are leaving a security era that demanded large numbers of U.S. combat forces stationed overseas or operating in forward locations at high states of combat readiness in order to confront a large and quantitatively superior opponent. That era has ended. We are entering a security era that permits a shift in our overall strategy more toward smaller force levels, with fewer overseas deployments and lower operating tempos. . . . It will be a smaller force than we have today. We all know that. . . . It will have to be just as professional--and even more flexible. The force will still need a basic amount of combat and operations training to sustain maximum proficiency . . . as well as readiness. But there will be a much greater opportunity than in the past to use military assets and training to assist civilian efforts (Nunn, 1993, pp. 1-2)

The final sentence of Senator Nunn's quotation refers to using the military in domestic "efforts" (Nunn, 1993), but his ideas have a much broader application.

While some surely saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to slash an oversized and unnecessary defense community and profit from the "peace dividend," others looked for ways to maintain the military infrastructure. Planners sought ideas to preserve military budgets by assisting civilians. Many proposals for use of the military in the so-called "non-traditional" missions such as disaster response, interdiction of drugs and refugees, peacekeeping, and humanitarian response and aid began to emerge and continue to this day. The term "double-duty dollars" was used to justify programs that would maintain military might while serving the populace in the process (Eitelberg, 1993, pp. 19-20). The remainder of this chapter focuses on these varied programs and proposals.

Table 4. Summary Chronology of Non-Traditional Missions
in U.S. Military, 1989-Present

<u>Year</u>	<u>Non-Traditional Mission</u>
1989-on	National Guard support for domestic disaster relief
1989-on	UNTSO - U.N.-led Middle East peacekeeping operation
1989-on	MNF - U.S.-led peacekeeping operation in the Sinai desert
1989-on	Humanitarian & Civic Assistance program in Central America
1989-on	Humanitarian Assistance Program: excess property and aid
1989-on	Denton Program: space available transport of relief supplies
1989-on	Lead agency for detection/monitoring for the Drug War
1989	Clean-up support for Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska
1989	Hurricane Hugo - domestic disaster relief in South Carolina
1989	Loma Prieta earthquake - disaster relief in San Francisco
1991	Operation Sea Angel - flood relief in Bangladesh
1991	Fiery Vigil - evacuation after Philippine volcanic eruption
1991-on	UNIKOM - U.N.-led peacekeeping operation in Kuwait
1991-93	Able Manner - Haitian migrant interdiction
1991-on	MINURSO - U.N.-led peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara
1991-on	Operation Provide Comfort - Kurdish relief effort in Iraq
1992	Civil disturbance control for Los Angeles riots
1992-on	Provide Hope - humanitarian relief in former Soviet Union
1992-94	Provide Relief/Restore Hope - aid/peace ops in Somalia
1992-94	Operation Provide Promise - humanitarian aid to Bosnia
1992	Operation Provide Transition - election support in Angola
1992	Hurricane Andrew - domestic disaster relief in Florida
1992	Typhoon Omar - domestic disaster relief in Guam
1992	Hurricane Iniki - domestic disaster relief in Hawaii
1992	Noncombatant evacuation from Monrovia, Liberia
1992	Noncombatant evacuation from Tajikistan
1992	Flood relief in Pakistan
1993	Support for Chinese migrant interdiction in Kwajalein
1993	Election transition support for Cambodia
1993	Flooding in U.S. Midwest - domestic disaster relief
1993-on	UNPROFOR - U.N.-led peacekeeping operation in Macedonia
1993-on	Commencement of SecDef Civil-Military programs
1993	Earthquake relief for Bombay, India
1994	Northridge earthquake - domestic disaster relief in L.A.
1994	Operation Support Hope - humanitarian assistance in Rwanda
1994	Support for interdiction of Cuban balseros
1994	Flooding in U.S. Southeast - domestic disaster relief
1994-on	Humanitarian demining program
1994-on	UNOMIG - U.N.-led peace operation in Georgia
1994-on	Operations Uphold/Maintain Democracy in Haiti
1994-95	UNMIH - U.N.-led peace operation in Haiti

B. LAW ENFORCEMENT

1. The Drug War Expands

When Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989, the military was tasked with greater involvement in drug enforcement efforts. DOD was given the responsibility for:

- serving as the single lead federal agency for detecting and monitoring air and seaborne drug smugglers;
- integrating command, control, communications, and technical intelligence functions of agencies involved in drug interdiction into an effective network; and
- approving and funding state plans for use of the National Guard in drug enforcement activities.

These measures were aimed at improving agency coordination and interdiction levels. However, the military was still restricted from involvement in actual apprehension and seizure operations. (GAO 1991, NSIAD-91-117)

To accomplish the detection and monitoring mission, DOD established an organizational structure typical of that used for traditional missions. An Assistant Secretary of Defense position as DOD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support was created to handle policy issues. The operational issues were delegated to the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of the respective geographic areas. In turn, the CINCs implemented joint task forces (JTF-4 in Key West for CINCLANT, JTF-5 in Alameda for CINCPAC, and JTF-5 in El Paso for CINCFOR) to bring about the coordination of agencies and resources. The joint task forces also act to coordinate and disseminate intelligence information to and from law enforcement agencies. (GAO 1991, NSIAD-91-117)

To integrate communications, the military purchased \$143 million in telecommunications equipment. This equipment was then loaned to law enforcement agencies to foster interoperable and secure communications. DOD also worked to develop a data network known as the Anti-Drug Network that would provide automatic transfer of information and intelligence among the military and civilian agencies involved in the Drug War. (GAO 1991, NSIAD-91-117)

Some in Congress were concerned that the armed forces were not moving quickly enough. In July 1989, "the House Committee on Armed Services admonished DOD for being slow to implement the responsibilities assigned to it in the 1988 Authorization Act, and for failing to include funds for drug interdiction in its budget request." (U.S. Congress, House 1990, p. 10) However, a 1990 staff report to the House Committee on Government Operations concluded:

This reluctance has now apparently given way to a new willingness to implement its anti-narcotics responsibilities, which was spurred in part by the Secretary's [of Defense] emphasis on the importance of DOD's participation in anti-drug activities and, according to some media accounts, by the perception that the threat to U.S. security from the communist bloc countries has substantially lessened and that the current national security threat is from drugs. (U.S. Congress, House 1990, pp. 10-11)

Whatever the reason, a sign of the military's new role in the Drug War was a funding increase for detection and monitoring from \$211.5 million in fiscal 1989 to over \$800 million in fiscal 1993. All DOD drug enforcement-related funding in fiscal 1993 amounted to \$1.14 billion; however, this sum was less than one percent of the total defense budget for that year. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220)

The added funding brought a corresponding surge in the activity of the armed services. It was reflected by increases in flying hours and steaming days between fiscal 1989 and

fiscal 1993 (estimated) from 18,436 to over 94,000 and from 2,081 to nearly 5,000, respectively (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220). Drug seizures in the Caribbean increased from 8.2 metric tons in 1989 to 70.5 metric tons in 1991 (Dorsey, 1992). Beginning in September 1989, U.S. military personnel were sent to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to help train forces of those countries in operations against narcotics producers and traffickers (Collier, 1989). In 1992, 14,500 pounds of cocaine were seized by joint Army/Drug Enforcement Agency and Bahamian police involvement in OPBAT (Operations Bahamas Turks and Caicos). The National Guard has been used to help patrol the U.S./Mexico border and to assist the Customs Service in searching shipping containers, as traffickers sought to find more effective transshipment alternatives to aerial and maritime methods. (Getler, 1993)

Considerable concern about negative aspects of military drug enforcement participation continues to this day. Some of the concern relates to interagency coordination gaps and overlapping areas that still exist and cause inefficiencies or problems with unity of effort. These may be partially the result of the lack of overall authority and control of assets during operations for DOD or any other agency. A 1993 GAO report concluded that the costs of the military's drug control efforts outweighed their effectiveness. These conclusions were based upon law enforcement apprehension capabilities that did not match the surveillance output of military efforts and the continued availability of low-priced cocaine on U.S. streets. Additionally, the report stated that drug enforcement operations caused a degradation of military readiness and placed extra morale and maintenance burdens on personnel and resources. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220)

DOD disputed the readiness charges and contended that crews involved in counterdrug operations still meet all annual training requirements. Military leaders also maintained that

the anti-narcotics missions are just part of the overall operational tempo necessary for readiness (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-220).

Recent changes have attempted to address the coordination issues. In 1994, the Commandant of the Coast Guard was appointed to the newly created position of U.S. Interdiction Coordinator with responsibility for the whole national interdiction effort. Additionally, the joint task forces were reorganized and renamed as Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs). Most importantly, the JIATF leaders now have tactical control of other agency's assets, which should bring about a more "seamless" detection, monitoring, interdiction, and seizure effort (Thomas, 1994). With regard to those who maintain that the military has had little real impact, many feel that drug traffickers are being forced to undertake more expensive and indirect shipping methods (Getler, 1993). However, considering the profit margins involved, interdiction alone will not win the war, and it is only one part of America's anti-drug effort. The reduction of demand for drugs is perhaps the most important element of the strategy. (Dorsey, 1992)

Despite the lack of consensus on how to wage the Drug War, there appears to be little doubt about the high level of performance by military personnel. Representative Charles Rangel voiced this point succinctly when he stated that "the U.S. military was reluctant to get involved in this thing [anti-drug campaign] But, since they've accepted the mission, they've done a fantastic job in converting wartime technology to assist local, state and federal law enforcement." (Getler, 1993, p. 73) Regardless of where one falls in the broad spectrum of arguments over source country solutions, interdiction, education and reduction of demand, or even legalization, one fact appears clear: U.S. military

participation in the War on Drugs is another example of the military answering the call for a non-traditional mission.

2. A Flood of Migrants

The September 1991 military coup in Haiti that ousted President Aristede resulted in a large upsurge in Haitian refugees seeking to immigrate to the U.S. via boat. While U.S. policy has changed with time, it basically aimed at interdicting the Haitian vessels, interviewing the refugees, and repatriating those without a basis for asylum. Because of the massive numbers of Haitians attempting to reach America, DOD assets and personnel participated in the efforts as part of what became known as Operation Able Manner. (Parker, 1993)

A refugee camp was established at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba and supported by DOD personnel for the overflow of refugees being processed. This activity became known as Operation Guantanamo and included Army Reserve volunteers in addition to an active-duty civil affairs battalion (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1993). U.S. Marines were embarked on some Coast Guard cutters as security detachments to provide added assistance. Navy ships assisted in the interdiction efforts as well. More than 31,000 Haitian refugees were interdicted in 1992 with over 13,000 in May alone. In response, the U.S. adopted a policy of repatriating all Haitian refugees to deter attempted voyages (Parker, 1993). However, the Haitian exodus continued.

Between February and March 1993, the military assisted other agencies involved in a case of Chinese refugees seeking to illegally immigrate to the U.S. Nearly 150 tons of cargo was transported between Hawaii and Kwajalein to support the care and feeding of the 535 Chinese while the diplomatic procedures to resolve the situation were in process. (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995)

In the Caribbean, the Navy hospital ship Comfort was put into service as an initial Haitian refugee processing center and preliminary medical treatment center. Also, a 50-bed Air Force Air Transportable Hospital was brought to GTMO to help provide care for the refugees there (Gunby, 1994). In June 1994, the U.S. sent additional military personnel to GTMO to manage the growing refugee camps. Almost 3,900 Army troops were deployed to GTMO by November (Eklund, 1995). Part of this increase was due to the arrival of Cuban refugees in addition to the Haitians.

As a result of social unrest and policy statements of the Castro regime in Cuba, a large number of Cubans boarded rafts and vessels of all description to sail for America. As the number of refugees increased, the Clinton administration announced on August 20, 1994 that the Cuban refugees or "balseros" would no longer be granted political asylum and allowed into the U.S. Refugee camps for the Cubans were constructed in GTMO in addition to the existing Haitian camps. The "balseros" who were interdicted were sent to GTMO, and ten Navy ships were involved in the efforts. (U.S. Department of State, 1994)

By early September of 1995 more than 14,000 Cuban refugees had joined 14,000 Haitian refugees in GTMO, and the size of the Cuban camps had been expanded to house a total of more than 50,000 balseros (Church, 1994). Later in September, the first of some 8,500 Cuban refugees were sent from GTMO to four camps in Panama because of overcrowding at the base in Cuba (Washington Times, 1995).

Additionally, in October 1994, over 200 Army personnel went to Surinam as part of Operation Distant Haven. They opened and ran a refugee camp for more migrant refugees that had been in GTMO (Eklund, 1995). In December, thousands of Cuban refugees at two of the camps in Panama rioted because of frustration over U.S. refusal to permit them to come to

America, and some soldiers were injured. Coupled with a request from Panama to have all of the refugees out of the country by March 6th, more soldiers were scheduled to be sent to GTMO and Panama in January 1995. Twelve hundred soldiers were to deploy to Panama and another 1,800 to GTMO to provide extra security for the movement of the refugees. (Washington Times, 1995)

The returning Cuban refugees were to join 20,000 Cuban and 3,500 Haitian refugees still in GTMO. However, plans were being made to return the Haitian refugees to their home country since President Aristide had been returned to power. (Washington Times, 1995)

Discussions for solutions to the refugee problem are still underway. The latest turn of events was the May 2, 1995 announcement of a new Cuban refugee policy by the Clinton administration. Under this new policy, all of the nearly 20,000 Cuban refugees in GTMO would be allowed into the U.S. with the exception of roughly 500 people who will be returned to Cuba because of either criminal records or some other disqualifying factor (Matthews, 1995). Future "balseros" will be returned to Cuba.

After the current population of Cuban refugees are moved to either the U.S. or Cuba and the remaining Haitians are returned to Haiti, DOD should be able to shut down the GTMO refugee camps. This will save an estimated \$1 million a day in operating costs and release nearly 6,000 U.S. armed forces members now in GTMO to help manage the refugee camps (Matthews, 1995). However, when the instability and strife in some regions of the world are considered, it is clear that the migrant interdiction chapter of the U.S. military's non-traditional mission history is not yet finished.

C. DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE

1. Civil-Military Cooperative Action Program

In 1992, Senator Sam Nunn introduced legislation aimed at using the military to help meet domestic needs. His proposal sought to utilize the armed forces in civilian projects compatible with training for their primary military missions. At the same time, the civil-military activities would aid American society while building unit morale and cohesion. (Nunn, 1993)

Senator Nunn's program was based upon the following three "essential" principles:

- projects would conform with the mission of the specific unit involved;
- projects would fill needs not being otherwise met, and not be in competition with services provided by private or government organizations; and
- projects could not be used to justify extra funding or personnel retention. (Nunn, 1993)

Additionally, Nunn's program would seek to fill the following six objectives:

- enhance personal and unit training and morale through participation in significant community activities;
- encourage civil-military cooperation;
- foster equal opportunity and reduce racial problems and conflict;
- assist civil sector through use of military technological and manpower skills;
- advance local ecological, economic and social conditions in vicinity of military bases; and

- expand job, training, education, and recreation opportunities for disadvantaged youths and citizens. (Nunn, 1993)

Finally, Senator Nunn saw the military providing assistance by serving as role models, repairing civilian facilities and infrastructure, implementing a National Guard Youth Corps, and providing summer jobs, job training and education, medical transport, public health outreach programs, and nutritional assistance (Nunn, 1993). Senator Nunn summed up his proposal as follows:

Nothing gives military people more pride than carrying out a mission of humanity, a mission of peace, a mission of mercy. This is something they enjoy doing. It gives them tremendous satisfaction and it's something they do well. (Nunn, 1993, pp. 12-13)

The fiscal 1993 Defense Authorization Act established the Civil-Military Cooperative Action Program; and, in June 1993, the Secretary of Defense created a Directorate for Civil-Military Programs under the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs to implement the program. In October 1993, Congress approved roughly \$78 million for fiscal 1994 and \$80 million for fiscal 1995 for two types of pilot projects. (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995)

The first type mainly involves job training and education efforts that aid the community without decreasing military readiness. These programs would be funded by specific appropriation and benefit the armed forces through improved specialty and leadership skills. To date, seven education and job training-related programs affecting more than 30 states have been funded and instituted. These projects include Challenge, Starbase (also offshoots Starbase Atlantis and Starbase Kelly), Youth Conservation Corps and Urban Youth Corps, Seaborne Conservation Corps, Civil Air Patrol Falcon Flight Program, Community and Service Leadership Camp, and the

National Civilian Community Corps (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995). These job training and education programs are described in more detail in Appendix C.

The Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) Career Academies are another example of a civil-military education program currently in existence. However, this program is funded by the President's Defense Conversion and Reinvestment Initiative of 1993 instead of the Civil-Military Programs Directorate. The JROTC Career Academies look to support transition assistance in cities hurt by base closures and military downsizing. They employ retired military personnel as teachers and administrators and seek to provide "at risk" high school students with skills development, discipline, responsibility, and values (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995). This program is also described in more detail in Appendix C.

The second type of civil-military program is aimed at meeting community health care or infrastructure needs as part of military training. These efforts would either use volunteers or be funded from the DOD training budget with little impact on operational funding. The projects would benefit military personnel by allowing a training requirement to be met in a more realistic environment. (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995)

A total of nine programs, combining either military training or volunteer efforts with domestic assistance, were approved for fiscal 1994 and fiscal 1995. (Only eight are discussed here since one of the programs, Sea Partners, is run by the Coast Guard Reserve and this paper concentrates on DOD initiatives.) These programs have been implemented in over 34 states and have, as an incentive, received funding support from the Civil-Military Programs Directorate for some incremental costs. The joint military training/civil assistance programs include GuardCare, Merlin, CAREFORCE, Arch

Angel, Reef-Ex, Operation KotzebueCare, Winslow, and a project involving the Fourth Cliff Family Recreation Area (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995). These programs are described in greater detail in Appendix C.

In fulfilling the requirements of the program tasking, the different services examine mission validity with respect to training, domestic needs, and cost-effectiveness. Project, geographic, and force structure diversity, potential for short-term completion along with sustainable growth, and conformity with other government and private efforts are also investigated. (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, 1995)

Although it is too early to determine the long-term success of these programs, they do seem to show promise. It appears that a concerted effort is being put forth to properly coordinate and operate these programs within legal guidelines and the initial vision for the efforts. If these programs are able to provide quality military training, build civil-military bonds, and address domestic needs without degrading readiness, they will indeed provide "double duty" dollars to the American taxpayer. Additionally, the new civil-military programs have a successful precedent in the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), which is briefly described in Chapter II. The CCC was essentially a youth employment program, and the Army played a major role in its administration. The CCC helped to preserve the nation's natural resources and has been heralded as one of the greatest social action successes of the federal government (Sherraden, 1981).

President Clinton asked for \$76 million for the Civil-Military Cooperation Action program for fiscal 1996. The new, Republican-controlled Congress has sought to cut the program entirely as the fiscal 1996 defense budget is debated

(Scarborough, 1995). As the saying goes, only time will tell whether the new initiatives can be as successful as the CCC.

2. Disaster Relief

Since 1989, a number of major disasters have occurred in the U.S. or in U.S. concerns. The role of the military, particularly that of the active-duty components, has increased as well. Between 1989 and 1992, for example, more than 11,000 active-duty members participated in disaster relief efforts (Kelly, 1992). The continuing National Guard response to domestic disasters can be viewed in Appendix A.

The Exxon Valdez disaster in March 1989 was the largest and most damaging oil spill in America's history. Despite a lack of experience in spill cleanup operations, the Army Corps of Engineers deployed two dredges to Alaska that were instrumental in oil recovery efforts (McDonnell, 1992). The Air Force supplied airlift support for the task (Military Airlift Command Office of History, 1991).

In addition to the usual National Guard forest fire-fighting actions, the Air Force carried the equivalent of 150 C-141 aircraft cargo loads to provide personnel and equipment support to the efforts in 1989 (Department of the Air Force, 1990). Four active-duty battalions were used to help the Boise Interagency Fire Control battle fires in Oregon and Idaho (Kelly, 1992).

In fiscal 1990, members of the armed forces aided communities in South Carolina and the surrounding areas following Hurricane Hugo (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1991). During these endeavors, the Air Force airlifted 300 C-141 aircraft equivalent loads of supplies and personnel to the region (Department of the Air Force, 1990). Over 3,000 active-duty personnel from all four branches of the armed

forces took part in Hurricane Hugo relief response (Kelly, 1992).

Also in fiscal 1990, the military provided assistance to the San Francisco area after the Loma Prieta earthquake (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1991). Included in this aid was extensive participation by the Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers performed damage assessment surveys and administered contracts for construction and repair work (McDonnell, 1993).

Concern about the response of the federal government to Hurricane Hugo in 1989 led FEMA to develop a revised Federal Response Plan. Unveiled early in 1992, the Federal Response Plan is set up to respond to all types of natural and man-made emergencies. (Stoll, 1994)

The Federal Response Plan assigns disaster relief responsibilities to 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross and describes available assistance. As in the "Catastrophic Earthquake" plan described in Chapter III, the duties are divided into twelve different Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). DOD is the lead agency for Public Works and Engineering (ESF 3) and for Urban Search and Rescue (ESF 9) and has support-agency responsibilities for the other ten functions. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180)

During fiscal 1992, there were 54 presidentially-declared emergencies, and DOD participated in relief efforts for eight of them. The most significant of these were Hurricane Andrew, which struck Florida and Louisiana; Typhoon Omar, which damaged Guam; and Hurricane Iniki, which hit the Hawaiian island of Kauai. All three natural disasters occurred within a three-week period in August and September of 1992, with damage estimated at over \$25 billion. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180)

The National Guard was called out by the states (and Guam) in all cases, and active duty military were a part of the federal disaster response. The most severe damage

occurred in Florida, and that state also received the largest amount of DOD support. Nearly 25,000 Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel as well as over 5,000 Florida National Guardsmen supported Hurricane Andrew relief efforts. The damage was less severe in the other locations, and DOD participation was roughly 400 members in Louisiana (over 300 National Guard), nearly 800 in Guam (27 of which were National Guard), and more than 2,300 in Kauai (with slightly more than 400 National Guard). The financial estimate for total costs incurred by DOD during these relief efforts was approximately \$559 million. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180)

In Florida, state and local authorities were overwhelmed by the degree of devastation, and the National Guard fulfilled both humanitarian and law enforcement roles for the first four days. After regular active-duty units arrived to take over the humanitarian assistance efforts, the Guard personnel performed largely law enforcement duties. In the other locations, the local civilian agencies were able to provide much of the relief support, and both active-duty and National Guard outfits furnished humanitarian assistance on a smaller scale. While the nature of military efforts varied by location, typical support included the provision and distribution of food, water, ice, temporary housing, medical services, and construction materials along with help in repairing structures and removal of debris (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180). To list a few examples in Florida alone, the military cleared six million cubic yards of debris, provided medical care to 67,000 civilians, and repaired 98 schools (Mangual, 1993).

The military relief efforts were, for the most part, widely applauded. However, FEMA was faulted for inter-agency coordination problems that delayed assistance at times and for unresponsive damage and needs assessments (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180). As a result, some called for DOD to take over FEMA's

role in charge of disaster relief efforts. For example, Senator Bob Graham of Florida stated that "In the post-cold war era, this [command of disaster relief] could be an important new function for the military, not something done after hours, but as an ongoing significant part of the military task." (Booth, 1992, p. 42)

Both DOD and the Government Accounting Office (GAO) feel that military responsibility for disaster response would not be well-advised. DOD has no desire to infringe upon the boundaries of civil authority over the military and offers the critical point that the armed services may not have the resources available to control or respond to disaster relief should they be involved in major combat or other operations at the same time (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180). Additionally, state and local governments are prepared to respond to most emergencies without federal assistance. Increasing the military's burden to include the oversight and coordination functions could lead to budget and readiness difficulties (Livingstone, 1992). However, in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, a Bush administration official stated that the answer is not in expanding the military's role, but in improving FEMA and its ability to respond (Booth, 1992). To date, there has been no apparent shift in the general disaster response structure that would necessarily increase DOD involvement.

Military officials stated that readiness was not adversely affected by participation in the Andrew, Omar, and Iniki relief efforts because of the relatively short-term deployments. Of the 50 Army-related military units involved in these operations (16 regular Army and 34 National Guard), 41 reported readiness conditions either equal to or better than their status prior to the disasters. Of the other nine units (five Army and four Guard) where readiness decreased, the lower conditions were said to be "relatively insignificant" and not directly attributable to their

involvement in the disaster relief efforts. However, military officials also cautioned that longer-term commitments of personnel could have an adverse effect on readiness. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180, p. 24)

DOD officials further stated that the combat support and combat service-support personnel involved in the relief efforts were engaged in actions "very compatible with the functions they would be expected to perform in war" and that the combat personnel had "the opportunity to hone their leadership and command and control skills." (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180, p. 24)

The GAO report on DOD support for Andrew, Iniki, and Omar offered two suggestions for change. The first relates to existing legislation that severely limits the circumstances under which reserve personnel can be called up for disaster response. While individual reserve personnel may volunteer, section 637b (b) of title 10 of the U.S. Code prohibits activation of reserve units for disaster relief. The downside to the present situation is that, with the advent of the Total Force concept and subsequent service downsizing, most of the combat support and combat service-support forces are part of reserve units. As related earlier, it is these personnel who are best-trained to deal with situations akin to disaster relief and the fact that they are unavailable restricts DOD capability. DOD and Army Reserve officials support a provision that would improve their ability to utilize reservists. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180)

The second recommendation deals with Stafford Act restrictions on reimbursement. Until the President officially declares a disaster and FEMA tasks DOD with action, units run the risk of not being reimbursed for the cost of any early preparations they make in anticipation of needed support. While DOD officials state that reimbursement is never the deciding factor in their decision-making process, it is a

consideration in these austere budgetary times. A change in the law that would allow DOD to receive funding for early action in instances where it is highly likely they will be involved would probably decrease post-disaster relief delays. (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180)

In 1993, DOD revised DOD Directive 3250.1 to consolidate action toward "Military Support to Civil Authorities." The revision was aimed at eliminating confusion between previously existing "Military Support to Civil Defense" (wartime) and "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities" (peacetime) programs. (Stoll, 1994)

During fiscal 1993 flooding in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Wisconsin, over 10,000 National Guard personnel were supporting civil efforts at the peak of operations (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1993). Military satellites were also used to help track Mississippi River floodwaters. In January 1994, the military provided aid to thousands of victims of the Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles (Stoll, 1994). Later in 1994, armed forces personnel responded to severe flooding in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, and Air National Guard C-130 aircraft equipped with a modular airborne fire-fighting system were deployed for a record two months to help fight forest fires in Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1994).

Despite the controversies related above, the typical framework for current military disaster response remains as follows. If states or localities require more support than their governments can muster, state governors will normally first call in National Guard troops. However, DOD Directive 3025.1 authorizes local military commanders to use personnel and resources in "immediate response" to disaster situations for the prevention of damage and saving of lives and property (Stoll, 1994, p. 10). If the disaster is severe enough, the President will declare an "official" disaster and FEMA will

appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to coordinate federal response. If requested through FEMA, military forces will then provide primary or support assistance under the direction of the FCO (Stoll, 1994). No changes have been made to the rules governing the participation of reserve personnel in disaster response.

D. MISCELLANEOUS DOMESTIC PROPOSALS

The National Guard continued to provide control for various civil disturbances. Assistance to local law enforcement agencies during the 1992 riots in Los Angeles (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1992) and supplying equipment to federal agencies involved in the Branch Davidian episode in Waco, Texas in 1993 are but two examples (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1993). In fiscal 1994, National Guard personnel in Puerto Rico spent more than 139,000 person-days to help combat crime (U.S. National Guard Bureau, 1994). See Appendix A for an overview of continued National Guard domestic aid efforts.

In addition to the major initiatives and actions detailed in the previous two sections, there have been a number of other calls for domestic use of the military in recent years. Among these was a request by Sharon Pratt Kelly, then mayor of Washington, D.C., for National Guard assistance in combatting crime in her city.

In 1993, in an effort to reduce violent crime in Washington, D.C., Mayor Kelly worked with her city council and police department to compose a 16-point Violence Reduction Strategy. One of the points called for increasing "the level of support and expand[ing] the role of the National Guard in local law enforcement and crime prevention activities." (Kelly, 1994, p. 22) While mainly related to cracking down on the drug problem, the proposal called for the Guard to provide special lighting in areas identified with high levels of drug

activity, support drug enforcement operations with aerial and ground surveillance and reconnaissance, seal up abandoned buildings known to harbor drug dealing activities, set up roadblocks and augment the police in drug operations, provide technical and administrative support to the police department, and aid a community youth education program. (Kelly, 1994)

The National Guard had already been involved in several of these programs on a limited basis, but Mayor Kelly was requesting Presidential or Congressional authorization for control over the Guard similar to that permitted to state governors. Her request was denied by President Clinton because of legal restrictions on his ability to delegate Presidential authority. (Kelly, 1994)

Another example of a request for DOD civic-military assistance occurred in 1993. Congressmen McCandless and Traficant introduced legislation aimed at authorizing DOD personnel to assist the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Customs Service in the performance of "border patrol-related activities." (Baranzini, 1993, p. 11)

In the aftermath of the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, the Clinton administration has suggested using the military in an increased domestic anti-terrorism role. While the White House appears interested in utilizing armed forces expertise in chemical and biological weaponry, the mere idea of using the military has caused considerable consternation about posse comitatus violations and the like. (Baltimore Sun, 1995)

E. PEACE OPERATIONS

The world has seen a quantum increase in peace operations in the short time period following the end of the Cold War. Some attribute this increase to the thawing of barriers in the U.N. Security Council that had previously prevented agreements

allowing U.N. action to be taken (Linn, 1994). As an illustration, since 1948 the U.N. has initiated 36 peacekeeping missions; however, 23 of those were begun after mid-1988. In 1988, there were five U.N. peacekeeping operations in existence. As of March 1995, 16 are currently active. (Browne, 1995)

This section will illustrate U.S. military involvement in peace operations after 1989. As a preface to this discussion, definitions of the types of missions that fall under the banner of peace operations and the manner of their execution will be helpful.

While the word peacekeeping has been used generically to describe participation in any manner of peace-related operations, the term "peace operations" may be more appropriate. This term has come to represent a wide spectrum of missions. These include preventive deployments to keep conflict from breaking out, peacekeeping to monitor cease-fires with the consent of both sides, and peace enforcement to compel nations or factions to end a conflict. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR)

Other terms include peacemaking, which would involve diplomacy before preventive deployments were necessary, and peacebuilding, which would involve post-conflict action to strengthen the situation and prevent the scenario from deteriorating back toward strife (Allen and others, 1993). Humanitarian operations are included in some definitions, but, in this paper, these missions will be discussed in the humanitarian assistance section.

The execution of peace operations falls into three categories. These are U.N.-led, non-U.N.-led but U.N.-authorized, and those independent of the U.N. The peace operations in Bosnia are an example of U.N.-led peacekeeping. The U.S. intervention in Haiti was a coalition led by the U.S., but fully-authorized by the U.N. The long-standing MFO

peacekeeping operation in the Sinai is run by the U.S. and representative of a peacekeeping mission independent of the U.N. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR)

Peace operations within the peacemaking, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding categories are "generally noncombat operations to monitor an existing agreement, undertaken with consent of all major belligerent parties and conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations charter." (Wisner, 1993, p. 1) Peace enforcement missions are "armed intervention, involving all necessary measures to compel compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions and conducted under Chapter VII of the [U.N.] charter." (Wisner, 1993, p. 1)

1. The Growth of U.S. Involvement in Peace Operations

In 1989, the only peace operations U.S. military personnel were involved with were the U.N. UNTSO mission in the Middle East and the U.S.-led MFO in the Sinai. At that time, guidance for American contributions to U.N. peace actions was set forth by the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, as amended. This regulation stated that a maximum of 1,000 U.S. military personnel could be "detailed to the United Nations in noncombat roles to help peacefully resolve disputes." (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR, p. 8)

Since 1989, U.S. military personnel have been a part of eight new U.N.-led peace operations. A historical overview of American involvement in U.N. peace operations can be seen in Appendix D. The U.S. military also led U.N.-authorized operations in Somalia and Haiti, and, in several instances, provided airlift or other support to operations in which the U.S. was not otherwise actively engaged. Additionally, U.S. air and naval forces served in blockade or sanction operations

such as Deny Flight in Bosnia and Southern Watch in Southern Iraq. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR)

In June 1992, the Secretary-General of the U.N., Boutros Boutros-Ghali, spoke to the U.N. Security Council about his vision for increasing U.N. ability to bring about peace and stability. Among his desires were more control of U.N. military operations through a revitalized U.N. Military Staff Committee, a U.N. commanded standing military force for U.N. use (under Article 43 of the U.N. charter), and better funding and logistics avenues to allow the U.N. to complete actions undertaken. (Lewis, 1993)

Between August and October 1992, the military provided support to Operation Provide Transition in Angola. Following negotiations that ended a 16 year-long civil war, Air Force aircraft transported Angolan soldiers to their homes before scheduled national elections. In a similar operation in May 1993, U.S., Australian, Indonesian, and Namibian personnel and peacekeeping forces were transported to Cambodia to oversee Cambodia's first free elections in 40 years. (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995)

In September 1992, President Bush addressed the U.N. General Assembly and supported the need for U.N. member-states to train personnel for peacekeeping duties, but he maintained the existing U.S. position that individual governments should have the final say on whether their soldiers would be used. President Bush also stated that U.S. military communications, intelligence, logistics, and transportation forces would be available to assist U.N. peacekeeping units. (Lewis, 1993)

In November 1992, a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) unit became operational in Zagreb to provide medical support to the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) operation in the former Yugoslavia. This action marked the first instance where an entire U.S. unit served under U.N. control. In July 1993, Army personnel deployed to Macedonia to take

part in a peacekeeping effort to patrol the border between Albania and Serbia and deter the spillover of conflicts in the region. Over 800 U.S. troops are now involved as part of UNPROFOR. (Browne, 1995)

U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in December 1992 as part of Operation Restore Hope (Eklund, 1995). This mission had begun as a humanitarian relief effort (Provide Relief), with air delivery of food starting in August (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995). However, the operation became a peace enforcement mission, so it will be included in this section.

Before the U.S. forces were inserted into Somalia, the Air Force transported Pakistani members of the U.N.-led UNOSOM I peacekeeping mission into the country in September (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995). The U.S. deployment in Somalia became part of the U.N.-authorized, but U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) aimed at establishing a safe environment for the humanitarian relief actions. In May 1993, UNITAF ceased operations and was replaced by the U.N. UNOSOM II mission. UNOSOM II's maximum authorized personnel strength of 28,000 included 2,833 U.S. troops from logistics and administrative units. (Browne, 1995)

Tensions between different factions in Somalia and U.N. forces increased. In August 1993, 400 Army Rangers were sent to the country in response to the violence directed at U.N. peacekeepers. Following a battle between a group of the Rangers and forces belonging to Somali warlord Mohamed Aideed in early October, an additional 1,300 troops were rushed to Somalia along with M-1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995). However, 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in one battle on October 3rd. Although over 17,000 more personnel were sent to the area initially, as American public opinion turned against the U.S. intervention in Somalia, President Clinton announced that

all but several hundred support troops would leave Somalia by the end of March 1994 (Roos, 1993). On March 25, 1994, the last U.S. military forces left Somalia (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995). UNOSOM II ceased operations a year later in March 1995 (Browne, 1995).

The loss of American life in Somalia cast a large shadow upon the heretofore rapid rise in the popularity and support of U.S. involvement in peace operations. Questions concerning what types of peace operations to participate in, what conditions to insert U.S. troops under, and what limitations to place upon the "tangible and intangible costs" of the missions began to abound (Roos, 1993, p. 13). After a visit to Somalia in the wake of the U.S. casualties, Congressman Robert Dornan called attention to the potential loss of American prestige and lack of a clearly evident mission inherent in U.N. peace actions. Some called for a "broader reassessment of the costs of U.S. involvement in U.N. operations." (Roos, 1993, p. 13)

The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal 1994 and 1995 limited the U.N. contribution assessed to the U.S. to 25 percent of U.N. operation costs, as of fiscal 1996. This legislation also placed peace operation reporting requirements on the President, and it required the President to notify Congress 15 days before the U.S. would provide peacekeeping assistance to the U.N. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR)

In an effort to reform U.N. peace operations and set policy for U.S. participation, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) in May 1994. The goal of PDD-25 was to "ensure that UN missions have clear and realistic objectives, that peacekeepers are equipped properly, that money is not wasted, and that an end-point to UN action can be identified." (U.S. President, 1995, p. 17) The major issues addressed in PDD-25 can be summarized as follows:

- Ensure disciplined choices about which peace operations to support and when to involve U.S. personnel;
- Reduce U.S. costs for U.N. peace operations;
- Reaffirm long-standing U.S. policy that U.S. forces involved in U.N. peace operations may be placed under the temporary operational control of a U.N. commander, but the U.S. will never relinquish command of U.S. personnel;
- Reform and strengthen U.N. capability to manage peace operations effectively;
- Improve the manner in which the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations; and
- Improve cooperation between the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the American public with regard to peace operations. (U.S. President, 1995, p. 17)

On September 8, 1994, U.S. forces entered Haiti as part of a successful multi-national (although largely U.S.) force to restore exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995). Peak Army strength was over 18,000 in October 1994 (Eklund, 1995). This mission, known first as Operation Uphold Democracy and then as Operation Maintain Democracy, was transferred to United Nations control in April 1995. (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995)

As of March 6, 1995, there were 1,139 members of the U.S. military serving under U.N. control in peace operations (Browne, 1995). The locations of these personnel are detailed below in Table 5. However, as of January 1, 1995, there were 25 other nations contributing more troops to U.N. peacekeeping than the U.S. (U.S. President, 1995).

According to a GAO report released in February 1995, DOD had incurred incremental costs of \$1.9 billion for peace operations in fiscal 1994. Although this figure also included the cost of humanitarian assistance such as the mission in

Table 5. U.S. Military Personnel Under U.N. Control
as of March 6, 1995

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Total Number</u>
UNTSO (Middle East)	17
UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait)	15
MINURSO (Western Sahara)	30
UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia)	861
UNMIH (Haiti)	212
UNOMIG (Georgia)	4
TOTAL	1,139

Source: From Marjorie Ann Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB90103, 21 March 1995, p. 5.

Iraq, it specified expenditures of \$528 million in Somalia and \$371 million in Haiti. The GAO estimate for fiscal 1995 DOD peace operation costs was \$2.1 billion. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR)

The GAO report also expressed concern about the funding mechanism for American involvement in peace operations. DOD budgets so as to be prepared to act, but it does not specifically budget for the costs of an operation or contingency. Therefore, when DOD uses its forces in an operation, the costs are either paid for out of existing operations and maintenance funding or recouped through supplemental appropriations. The danger inherent in this method is that DOD may not be able to pursue necessary planned activities because of peacekeeping or other contingency operations. Another factor in the budget equation is that the U.N. only reimburses the U.S. and other countries for participation in U.N.-led operations. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR)

Also, certain U.S. military units and resources have experienced greatly increased operational tempos as a result of the rise in peace operations. Combat readiness could decline unless the tempo is controlled or more reserve forces are utilized. Finally, the GAO raised concerns over the ability of DOD forces involved in a large peace operation to quickly respond to and be prepared for the sudden emergence of a Major Regional Conflict. (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR)

At this time, there are two major bills underway in Congress that would affect U.S. participation in peace operations. These are the Peace Powers Act of 1995, in the Senate, and the National Security Revitalization Act, in the House (Browne, 1995). This legislation is aimed at clarifying requirements for reports to Congress, controlling costs for DOD support of some U.N. actions, and requiring the President to certify that U.S. security interests are at stake when U.S. military forces are placed under the command or operational control of U.N. commanders (GAO 1995, NSIAD-95-102BR).

There have been calls for alternatives to the use of American armed forces in peacekeeping. For instance, some have called for the creation of an expanded Peace Corps to perform the function in a civilianized manner similar to that of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) organization during the Vietnam War. The military would assume a support role providing transportation, logistics, and security assistance (Summers, 1993). On the other hand, some have suggested that certain military units receive training and be used specifically for peace operations (The Defense Monitor, 1995).

In 1994, a number of changes in U.N. peace operation procedures were made. These included the establishment of a 24-hour situation center at U.N. headquarters, streamlining of peace operation budgeting using DOD methodology, the appointment of an American as Under-Secretary General for

Administration and Management to implement reforms, and other actions to strengthen planning, logistics, legal protection, procurement, training and command capability (U.S. President, 1995). President Clinton made the following statement about peace operations in February 1995:

I have made UN peacekeeping reform a key goal, working to reduce costs and improve efficiency, using UN peacekeeping when it will work and restraining it when the situation is not ripe. More needs to be done to make UN peacekeeping realize its potential and more effectively serve our interests. It is in the U.S. interest to ensure UN peacekeeping works, and to improve it, because peacekeeping is one of the most effective forms of burdensharing available. Today, other nations pay more than two-thirds of the costs of peacekeeping and contribute almost 99% of the troops. Troops from seventy-seven nations are deployed throughout the world in the service of peace. (U.S. President, 1995, p. 4)

For the foreseeable future, peace operations are likely to be a continuing role for the U.S. military. The extent of this involvement remains to be seen in the wake of U.N.-reform efforts, public opinion, Congressional questions about the need for U.S. commitment overseas, and budget, force structure, and readiness concerns.

2. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

U.S. military forces continued to provide safety for U.S. citizens abroad through noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). In 1990, U.S. Marines operating from Navy amphibious ships assisted in a NEO to get U.S. citizens out of Liberia in the midst of unrest in that country. In January 1991, a U.S. amphibious force evacuated U.S. embassy and other personnel out of Mogadishu, Somalia. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1993)

In October 1992, U.S. forces conducted two NEOs. The first involved the airlift of 96 U.S. citizens out of

Monrovia, Liberia because of conflict between different Liberian factions. Twenty-four of the people evacuated were U.S. embassy officials. The second NEO occurred in Tajikistan during fighting between forces supporting the acting president and those supporting the ousted president. Twelve U.S. embassy employees and nine foreign nationals were transported out of Dushanbe, Tajikistan. (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995)

3. International Military Education and Training

As mentioned in Chapter II, DOD continues to provide assistance to other nations to this day. Some of the legislation which has affected this area are the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and the Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989. While the specific nature of the assistance has changed over time, it has largely been aimed at promoting democracy. (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83)

Currently, the Security Assistance programs include Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Economic Support Funds (GAO 1992, GAO/NSIAD-92-248). Of these programs, IMET is of most interest. IMET was established by the aforementioned International Security and Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83) for the purposes of building relations between the U.S. and foreign countries. The State Department has responsibility for setting policy and general direction of the program, but DOD is charged with implementing IMET. (GAO 1992, GAO/NSIAD-92-248)

Expenditures for IMET had averaged roughly \$47 million to train about 5,000 people from approximately 100 foreign countries. As a result of the end of the Cold War, Congress, in fiscal 1991, amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

with an expanded IMET initiative. The new IMET initiative was aimed at promoting civilian control over the military, managing defense resources, improving military justice systems, and fostering human rights. The initiative allowed the training of civilian personnel as well. (GAO 1992, GAO/NSIAD-92-248)

Beginning in fiscal 1992, Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries became part of IMET for the first time. Also, Mobile Education Teams were established to bring the training to more individuals on site in the foreign nations. (GAO 1992, GAO/NSIAD-92-248)

For fiscal 1993, about \$47 million was spent on IMET, with \$3.7 million specifically for the expanded IMET initiative (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83). For fiscal 1994, IMET funding was cut to a little over \$21 million although nearly \$4 million was still earmarked for continuation of the expanded IMET. There have been some concerns about providing IMET to countries guilty of human rights violations, a lack of emphasis on IMET teaching of human rights principles, and redundancy between different foreign aid programs; however, IMET appears to be a victim of declining defense budgets more than anything else (Rosen and Purnell, 1994). GAO has reported a largely positive response from the countries receiving IMET (GAO 1992, GAO/NSIAD-92-248) and an increased DOD emphasis on refining the curriculums for the expanded IMET initiative (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83).

Other recent program additions that may involve non-traditional missions include the CINC Initiative Fund, the Nunn-Lugar Initiative, and the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies (GAO 1994, GAO/NSIAD-94-83). As an example, under the CINC Initiative, a Navy judge advocate recently spent six months in Albania helping to draft a new constitution and working on new military law standards (Rosen and Purnell, 1994).

F. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FOREIGN)

The foreign humanitarian assistance programs are all now under the oversight and management of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (SecDef/H&RA). Since the end of the Cold War, the four programs described in the previous chapter have continued and a new program (humanitarian demining) has been added. Additionally, the American Armed Services have become involved in several large, longer-term humanitarian aid operations such as Operation Provide Hope (former Soviet Union) and Operation Support Hope (Rwanda). An overview of Air Force Air Mobility Command participation in recent humanitarian assistance efforts can be seen in Appendix E.

During this same time, some aspects of the humanitarian assistance programs have been criticized by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and have come under fire from Congress. Most of the complaints are related to perceptions of poor control of the programs and inefficient use of funds. Specific problem areas will be illustrated in the individual program discussions below.

As a result, SecDef/H&RA and DOD have worked to improve the programs, particularly in the areas of cost control, record-keeping, and oversight. A humanitarian daily ration has been developed that provides a nutritionally appropriate alternative to delivery of the military meals ready-to-eat (MREs). The humanitarian daily ration can be produced for one third of the cost of an MRE. Goods are being shipped by surface transportation rather than more expensive airlift when immediate delivery is not critical. Also, improved budget oversight has been instituted and missions are prioritized to ensure the neediest situations related to national foreign policy are supported first. (Irvin, 1994)

1. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program

In fiscal 1991, more than 8,000 National Guard personnel were deployed to Latin American to participate in the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) program. Another 10,000 troops were planned to train in HCA projects in 1993. The cost of consumable supplies and materials used in these civic assistance projects was \$6.6 million in fiscal 1992 with \$8.6 million estimated for 1993. (GAO 1994, T-NSIAD-94-158)

A 1994 GAO report and testimony to Congress stated that it was difficult to track the costs of the program because DOD did not report personnel and transportation costs for units involved. GAO also found that some projects "were not designed to contribute to foreign policy objectives, did not appear to enhance U.S. military training, and either lacked the support of the country or were not used." (GAO 1994, T-NSIAD-94-158, p. 2) Additionally, DOD was criticized for failure to issue a required regulation for governing the program even though six years had passed since HCA authorization. Weaknesses in the approval process, project evaluation, and coordination between DOD, the State Department, and the Agency for International Development were also noted. (GAO 1994, T-NSIAD-94-158)

In answer to the GAO report, SecDef/H&RA (which had only recently assumed responsibility for HCA) stated that the DOD regulation would be completed before the end of 1994. Additionally, SecDef/H&RA responded that DOD had recorded all HCA approvals in writing (some had previously been approved by telephone) since fiscal 1993, and, while evaluation and country need efforts were already in use, DOD was continuing to look into improving those processes. (Irvin, 1994)

Perhaps more importantly, SecDef/H&RA emphasized the training benefits to the armed services of HCA and stressed that all HCA project proposals are screened by the relevant

service commands for their ability to meet training requirements. The personnel and transportation costs are reported as training costs because the deployments are viewed as training exercises. \$5.8 million for HCA was included in the President's budget request for fiscal 1995. (Irvin, 1994)

2. Humanitarian Assistance Program

Utilization of the excess property provisions of the Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP) has grown with time. Between 1986 and 1992 over 57 million excess items were transferred by DOD. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the value of the items donated between 1986 and 1989 was roughly \$49 million. Although figures are not available for the value of items donated since 1989, most of the excess items have been delivered since 1990. To illustrate this point, the costs of transporting the excess items to the foreign countries grew from \$15 million in 1992 to \$28 million in 1993. (GAO 1994, T-NSIAD-94-158)

The value of items donated since 1990 is unavailable because DOD's reporting requirement was eliminated. GAO was critical of this fact in a 1994 report and Congressional testimony because there was no record of these sizable donations of excess property. SecDef/H&RA is discussing reporting procedures with DOD logistics branches that would more accurately reflect the actual value of the transferred items. (GAO 1994, T-NSIAD-94-158)

The funded transportation program continues to carry humanitarian goods also. In efforts to more efficiently use available funding, 95 percent of the material delivered in this program is now moved by surface transportation (Rourke, 1995).

In 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the U.S. military began providing assistance and protection to the

Kurdish people living in Northern Iraq. Between April and June of 1991 12,000 U.S. military personnel, mainly Army, were involved in these efforts. This mission became known as Operation Provide Comfort (Moskos, 1994). In 1994, the number of Army troops reached its zenith for the year in November at 131 people in this on-going effort (Eklund, 1995).

Operation Provide Hope involves transport of both privately donated and excess DOD property to the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Phase I of this continuing effort began in January 1992. In the month that Phase I lasted alone, nearly 4.5 million pounds of food and medicine were transported on 64 flights (Hogberg and Stone, 1993). Between inception and April 1994 over 250 missions were executed by U.S. military forces. The excess property transferred includes bulk food, MREs, hospitals, and medical supplies. (Irvin, 1994)

Smaller scale examples of recent excess property deliveries include the transfer of Bailey bridges to Mozambique to replace bridges destroyed in a civil war (Irvin, 1994). Also, in August 1993, Bailey bridges were flown to Katmandu, Nepal to take the place of bridges wiped out by flooding (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995).

Twenty-eight million dollars was appropriated for the HAP in fiscal 1993 and \$48 million in fiscal 1994. However, \$30 million of the fiscal 1994 budget was set aside for the operation in northern Iraq, which had previously been funded by separate appropriation. This effectively reduced the actual availability of money for other HAP activities. (Irvin, 1994)

Under the funded transportation program in 1994, over \$80 million worth of humanitarian relief cargo was delivered in 24 shipments. Sixteen shipments were made in the first quarter of 1995. (Rourke, 1995)

The President's budget request for fiscal 1995 included \$71.9 million for the HAP. Approximately \$15 million was planned for use in northern Iraq. Of the remaining funds, \$13 million was intended for the SecDef/H&RA high-priority region of sub-Saharan Africa. (Irvin, 1994)

3. Denton Program

Military support of the Denton program continued without change for the first few years of the post-Cold War period. However, during Desert Shield/Storm shipments were suspended (Rourke, 1995). This was most likely due to the lack of available airlift since almost all of the Air Force's transport aircraft were involved in carrying war materials and personnel to and from the Gulf region.

After the Gulf War ended the Air Force reassigned the two officers previously billeted to help manage the program. The amount of annual cargo carried under the Denton program dropped to an annual average of 200-300 thousand pounds for the next several years (Rourke, 1995). Despite this temporary drop in program utilization, a total of more than five million pounds of goods had been transported to 25 countries between the commencement of the program in 1985 and 1994 (Irvin, 1994).

In 1994, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs (SecDef/H&RA) made efforts to revitalize and reemphasize the Denton Program. That year, 35 Denton program missions were flown to transport roughly 900,000 pounds of cargo to fourteen countries including the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Venezuela. SecDef/H&RA has continued a proactive stance towards the Denton program in 1995. In the first quarter of 1995, 25 missions have been flown to carry 900,000 pounds of donated supplies to 16 countries. Additionally, the SecDef/H&RA

office has formed an informal partnership with the non-profit organization MAPS International to facilitate use of the program. (Rourke, 1995)

4. Foreign Disaster Relief and Assistance

Perhaps due to lesser control and stability resulting from the reduction in Cold War superpower tensions, the number of humanitarian emergencies in the world has increased significantly in recent years. By some measures, the number of humanitarian emergencies had grown to 17 in 1992 from an annual average of five during the 1978-1985 time span. In response to world and American demands, the U.S. has found itself more involved in attempts to stop or alleviate suffering (Irvin, 1994). As a result, in addition to continued disaster relief support, DOD has provided assistance in the aftermath of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and other results of regional instability.

Operation Sea Angel was the name given to the flood relief provided to Bangladesh by DOD in 1991. All the services played a role in the response in May and June of 1991, with 8,000 personnel involved at the peak of the operation. (Moskos, 1994)

After the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Phillipines in 1991, the Air Force evacuated personnel from the region in conjunction with Operation Fiery Vigil. More than 1,700 sorties were flown to transport 23,400 people and 44,400 tons of cargo in this humanitarian evacuation. (Builder and others, 1993)

Operation Provide Promise began in July 1992 to assist victims of the conflict in Bosnia. Between then and April 1994, DOD aircraft flew more than 5,000 sorties to bring relief supplies into Sarajevo and perform airdrop deliveries to isolated communities. Included among the material was over

50,000 metric tons of donated resources and 10 million DOD Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) or humanitarian daily rations. (Irvin, 1994)

In December 1992, the Air Force transported over 400 tons of vehicles and equipment to Pakistan following flooding. In October 1993, relief supplies from the U.S. Office of Disaster Assistance were flown to Bombay, India following an earthquake that killed 11,000 people. (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995).

Between May and September of 1994 over 23,000 tons of humanitarian relief supplies were flown into Tanzania and Uganda as part of Operation Support Hope. These missions were in support of Rwandan refugees who had fled a civil war in their country. (Air Mobility Command Office of History, 1995)

In fiscal 1993, \$50 million was appropriated for natural and man-made disaster relief to foreign nations. For fiscal 1994, however, Congress authorized the use of money from the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), which had previously been earmarked only for domestic disaster purposes. The President included a request for \$46.3 million for foreign disaster relief in his fiscal 1995 budget request (Irvin, 1994). The fiscal 1995 funding was requested as a new appropriation so that the money would be retained in DERF for the purposes originally intended (U.S. Congress, House 1994).

5. Humanitarian Demining Program

A fifth humanitarian assistance program has been established and is also under the oversight of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs. Congress authorized ten million dollars for a humanitarian demining program in fiscal 1994. The need for this program was based on estimates that there are over ten

million land mines in use worldwide that injure or kill more than 150 people every week. (Irvin, 1994)

Under the demining program, DOD and State Department personnel work with selected countries to develop programs that will educate local people on how to avoid land mines and train indigenous forces to locate and remove them. The larger aim of the humanitarian demining program is help countries to recover from conflict, rebuild economies, and allow refugees to return and resume farming in a more stable situation. (Irvin, 1994)

Special Operations Forces personnel have been involved in demining and mine awareness training in Cambodia (Holmes, 1995). Thirteen Army service members deployed to Cambodia in October 1994 (Eklund, 1995). As part of their efforts, psychological operations members developed a comic book in the native Cambodian Khmer language so that children would know what to do if they came across an area with antipersonnel mines. (Holmes, 1995)

In 1994, DOD assessment teams conducted demining program work in both Eritrea and Ethiopia. There were additional plans to expand the program to other locations in Africa and Latin America. (Irvin, 1994)

In summary, the period from the end of the Cold War in 1989 until the present was marked by extensive change in the world. As the United States has attempted to maintain its global leadership position while struggling to redefine policies and actions appropriate for new situations, the American military has been at the forefront of U.S. activities at home and abroad.

Non-traditional missions have become a highly-charged topic as America tries to define and structure its military for the perceived needs of the future. A number of complex issues exist with considerable bearing on the subject of performing non-traditional missions. The various facets of

the current non-traditional missions debate are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

V. ELEMENTS OF THE DEBATE: PAST AS PRELUDE TO THE FUTURE

The question of whether non-traditional missions are new to the military or, in fact, actually traditional has largely become a moot point. As an illustration, in December 1992 the National Defense University held a symposium called "Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era." In the published proceedings of the conference, it was noted that a consensus had concluded that the symposium was "mistitled." Most participants agreed that the so-called "non-traditional" missions had been performed for over 200 years and were, therefore, traditional. They decided that the discussion should have been more appropriately about "non-combat" roles. (Graham, 1993, pp. xii-xiii)

However, the delineation of "combat" vs. "non-combat" may not go far enough. Perhaps a more accurate assessment is that offered by Carl Builder.

What some have chosen to call the 'nontraditional' or 'less traditional' missions for military forces are actually more traditional than the 'traditional' ones, and they are likely to become more common in the future. They should not be referred to as 'supporting' or 'humanitarian' missions because too many of them are much more than this. They have been called the 'noncombat' missions and the missions 'short of war,' but they can involve combat and can be undertaken during other people's wars. None of these labels is really correct. Yet these missions have always been an integral part of the American military heritage and were of rising interest and speculation within the American defense community even before the sudden collapse of Communism.

There is a problem with terminology, and it is based on more than semantics. To assign names to these kinds of missions is to categorize them, and thereby to lend or deny them stature within the military services that perform them. If they were called 'secondary' missions to distinguish them from the 'primary' combat missions, this nomenclature would make stature differences

uncomfortably explicit: who wants to risk life, limb, or career for a secondary mission? Yet, to put them on an equal footing with the combat missions would lend them a stature that might undermine the established and zealously guarded hierarchical structures within all the American military services. Therein lies the most important clue to the future of these missions, and hence the subject to be examined. . . . Here, they will be called simply the 'other' missions, for they are other than the ones the American military services currently see as their principal purpose in being. But the distinctions were not always so important as they seem in the 1990s. (Builder, 1994, p. 225)

At this point, it would be constructive to combine Builder's thoughts with Huntington's "phases" of the U.S. military. Without much difficulty, Huntington's discussion can be viewed as a nation's military evolving to meet the needs of a changing nation. At times, this evolution has indeed made combat the primary focus of the armed forces. However, there have been periods when the military has been occupied primarily in roles unrelated to war. Cold War mentality aside, the previous three chapters of this thesis have painted a detailed picture of the extensive, consistent, and continuous involvement of the American military in non-traditional or "other," to use Builder's terminology, missions.

A. THE FIFTH MILITARY PHASE: ENGAGEMENT

Obviously, a new era or "phase" of American military focus is developing. Although in Chapter II, Table 1, the new fifth phase was left unnamed, calling this new period the "engagement" phase might be appropriate. In this sense, engagement means attending to needs in peacetime to decrease or prevent unrest or the use of force in the future (Brehm and Gray, 1992). Engagement reflects the wide variety of missions the U.S. military is involved in as America strives, in its

own way, to make the nation and the world safer and more stable in the absence of a discernable military threat.

Given the history and present status of non-traditional missions in the U.S. military, the question is how large and prominent a role should these "other" missions play in this new phase?

To clearly evaluate the future of non-traditional missions, one must look at more than just the recent past. The limited viewpoints expressed by those whose living memory spans the mere forty or fifty years of the Cold War fail to consider the broad legacy of the American military. By examining the present in the context of a rich and varied past, the future of the U.S. armed forces may be glimpsed. This chapter examines different facets of this question regarding the future of non-traditional missions in the U.S. military.

B. STUMBLING BLOCKS

The primary stumbling block to increased military involvement in non-traditional missions lies in the beliefs of the "new traditionalist" school, which concentrates on recent history at the expense of pre-Cold War events. Harry G. Summers, Jr., an advocate of tight control over non-combat uses of the military, has spoken of a "value system and a culture system within the armed forces of the United States" with the mission "to fight and win the nation's wars." (Summers, 1993, p. 69) This viewpoint is well-represented by the following quotation:

The true purpose of the military is combat--specifically, defeating an enemy. . . .

If the military changes its purpose and substitutes for its role as a combatant some less demanding activity, it will transform the organization. . . .

The moment such [non-traditional] missions become the military's purpose--or even its partial aim--the dangers and stress of combat will cease to guide our armed forces' training. (Cropsey, 1993, p. 77)

Cropsey argues that combat training alone is what enables the military to perform well in non-traditional missions and that substitution of noncombat functions to preserve the military budget will merely turn DOD into just another federal agency (Cropsey, 1993).

A June 1992 RAND workshop involving Air Force officers and aimed at exploring expanded noncombat mission capabilities experienced a deep division over the extent of American military participation in non-traditional missions. One segment of these officers felt that use of existing Air Force resources for these noncombat missions was permissible on an "as available" basis, but they were against any dedication of "training, force capabilities, personnel, or budget" for growth in this area (Builder and others, 1993, p. 63).

This group was concerned that Congress would not fund these non-traditional activities and that money for combat training and preparation would suffer as a result. Additionally, these officers believed that noncombat operations would "dilute" or even "undermine" the professionalism needed for an effective fighting Air Force (Builder and others, 1993, p. 63). They saw the mission of the Air Force (although this picture is equally applicable to all the U.S. armed services) as fighting. These officers were fully prepared to have an Air Force with smaller resources concentrated on the wartime mission instead of a large force involved in noncombat operations at the expense of the primary mission (Builder and others, 1993).

Steven Metz has enumerated the obstacles that he believes stand in the way of more effective U.S. military participation in peacekeeping, but, again, these issues are also relevant to

other non-traditional missions. According to Metz, attitude, training and education, and doctrine and planning must be addressed, and the national command authorities must demonstrate commitment to these missions for changes to occur. (Metz, 1993)

Along these lines, a panel of the 1992 National Defense University symposium on non-traditional missions offered the following recommendations:

- Discard the notion that non-traditional missions are simply chores that must be undertaken. Non-traditional missions must be viewed as effective instruments of American policy formulation;
- Non-traditional missions need to be addressed in U.S. national security policy; and
- Doctrine for non-traditional missions has to be developed. (Graham, 1993, p. 124)

An additional stumbling block is related to the natures of the services themselves. Carl Builder has proposed that the behavior of America's three major armed services can be explained by their institutional personalities. His premise is that the Navy's love of independence and tradition, the Air Force's love of flight and greater flying technology, and the Army's picture of itself as the servant of the nation underlie their respective strategies and actions. While not suggesting that the services place their own interests ahead of national security and national defense, Builder does believe that these "Masks of War" worn by the different military organizations stand as impediments to change as the services seek to maintain their own visions for existence and relevance. (Builder, 1989)

Placed in today's context of reduced budgets and downsizing, these thoughts on the military's institutional personalities can be construed as follows:

Funding constraints may rein in the service acquisitions, but not their desires. They may have to do with lesser quantities, but they will continue to pursue the qualities they want in their institution and in the forces they are able to acquire. Congress may put them on a diet, but the services will retain their menu and their appetites. Moreover, the services tend to see such a diet as a temporary state of affairs--one that will change when the 'enemy' manifests itself or when the political winds shift again in their favor. Thus, funding restraints result in the services tightening their belts, but not losing their grips on their institutional identities or dreams. (Builder, 1989, pp. 202-203)

These dreams of the individual services often pit one against the other. Examples of these inter-service rivalries abound. Air Force officials have been accused of seeking to maintain or gain missions from, or at the expense of, the other services throughout the ongoing Roles and Missions Commission (Glashow and Holzer, 1995). However, other observers rightly claim that "none of the services have a monopoly on parochialism" and have illustrated the fact that all the services engage in this type of behavior (Cornell, 1995, p. 12).

Clearly, large obstacles need to be overcome before non-traditional missions can become more accepted in the U.S. military. The next section discusses changes in America's concept of national security. Alternative viewpoints on non-traditional missions and appropriate use of the nation's armed forces are also presented.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY - THE NATURE OF THE BEAST

A White House document released in February 1995 had this to say about American national security:

The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed America's security imperatives. The central security challenge of the past half century--the

threat of communist expansion--is gone. The dangers we face today are more diffuse. (U.S. President, 1995, p. 6)

Samuel Huntington has stated "we now need the military policy and forces not to contain and deter an existing threat as we did during the Cold War but rather to prevent the emergence of a new threat." (Huntington, 1993, p. 7) To expand upon these thoughts, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was quoted in a 1990 Air Force white paper with the following statement about national security:

To maintain this state of affairs [where the risk of global war between the superpowers remains low], U.S. forces will protect U.S. security interests by providing the correct balance of military capabilities--forces capable of maintaining deterrence and protecting our national interests. As we search for that correct balance we can neither adopt the unrealistic assumption that nothing has changed, nor the historically naive presumption that everything has changed. (Department of the Air Force, 1990, pp. 2-3)

The critical question to be answered is: What does national security mean? Put another way, how are our national interests defined? Is military responsibility for national security a narrowly-defined concept of fighting wars to keep America safe or something broader?

In the regional conflicts so prevalent in the world today, some see the destruction of populations, land, and economies as having a "costly impact for decades to come." (Lewis and Sisk, 1993, p. 40) Further, this damage to the ecosystem and world stability could affect the U.S. (Lewis and Sisk, 1993), and it is in this increasingly alarming context that we must determine our answers to the national security questions.

Robert D. Kaplan characterizes the turmoil present in some parts of the world as "the coming anarchy." (Kaplan,

1994, p. 44) Using West Africa as one example, he has depicted the spreading social unrest, deforestation, overpopulation, and disease as the seeds for a breakdown of the existing concept of nation-states (Kaplan, 1994). This scenario outlines a large and elemental conflict with U.S. goals of "enlarging" the number of democratic states in the world. One can begin to see where a broader definition of national security and interest would be appropriate.

The environmental repercussions of this type of instability include mass migration of refugees and conflict over water and other resource shortages. At the very least, the spillover affects neighboring countries with the potential for a more global impact.

Proponents of broader use of the armed forces look at these possible environmental dangers to U.S. security and view DOD as a partial solution. They see the technological and organizational skills of the military being put to use through security assistance programs or other initiatives such as the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (a joint Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and DOD project established by Congress in 1990). The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Army Chemical Corps, various branches of the Army Medical Department, or similar units could be put to use for education, assessment, clean-up, and restoration of environment-related concerns, which could prevent damage that could endanger U.S. national security. (Butts, 1994)

Others who support using the military for non-traditional missions point to problems in the U.S. and claim that the greatest threats to national well-being are within the country's borders. Former Commerce Secretary Peter G. Peterson, for example, believes that domestic economic, educational, and urban difficulties threaten "America's long-term national security more than the traditional

preoccupations of security and foreign policy such as the menace of Soviet nuclear bombs or conventional attacks on our territory or vital interest." (Brehm and Gray, 1992, p. 5)

John L. Petersen has likened the desired response of the U.S. military in the face of this new security scenario to that of a successful business reacting to a changing market. He feels that the military's strategy should include the development of a new vision, adaptation to change, expansion of information technology and access, and expansion of the product line or roles and missions. Petersen sees the outcome as a "dual-use" military able to deal with both external and internal threats to U.S. national security. (Petersen, 1993)

In recognition of the new national and global dangers, the President's National Security Strategy has been broadened. The current policy, issued in February 1995, addresses the new threats in attempting to meet the stated goals of:

- Sustaining national security with military forces ready to fight;
- Bolstering America's economic revitalization; and
- Promoting democracy abroad. (U.S. President, 1995, p. i)

Likewise, the 1995 version of the National Military Strategy has affirmed "the importance of the growing use of U.S. forces in peacekeeping and other non-combat operations." (Graham, 1995, p. 36) The document also stated that, in addition to combat duties, the military must help "to reduce the sources of conflict." (Graham, 1995, p. 36)

Promotion of democracy has been called "one of the cheapest, most cost effective ways of advancing the national interest." (Lucy, 1994, p. 10) The Air Force has stated that contingency and humanitarian airlift actions "strengthen allies, provide humanitarian assistance, and allow the United States to influence events important to our national security

and the security of the free world (Department of the Air Force, 1990, p. 14).

Another example of the benefits of non-traditional missions to national security is the work of the Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia. Here, the Army personnel were involved in over \$14 billion worth of construction efforts. Some view the relationships and trust formed between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia during the building of these projects as instrumental to the manner in which Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were conducted. It was important that the Saudis knew that the Americans would do a good job and leave when the job was done; otherwise, Saudi Arabia might not have felt comfortable with providing the support that they did. (Cropsey and Brinkerhoff, 1993)

In response to the argument that DOD should not engage in any activities that could decrease their primary warfighting mission, Patricia Irvin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, has stated:

. . . I would say with respect to humanitarian emergencies, that great powers should venture beyond parochialism when the moment requires it--and we know complex humanitarian emergencies will happen again and again. Chaos, the distinguishing characteristic of humanitarian emergencies, is not in the interest of the United States anywhere: It is the ground on which political fanaticism is built and tyrants raised, and it is as destructive to the economy and infrastructure of a country as a full-scale war. I believe thriving economies in other countries are in the best interests of the United States. (Irvin, 1994, pp. 3-4)

This point of view can, and should, be extended beyond humanitarian assistance to include domestic use of the military and other foreign support. One side of the aforementioned RAND noncombat missions workshop controversy was presented in the previous section. The other side favors acceptance of noncombat missions as a vital and increasing part of Air Force operations. These officers felt that the

noncombat missions offered training benefits for combat preparation. They rejected the claims that the Air Force's "combat capability" or "professional fighting spirit" would be reduced were non-traditional missions to be conducted (Builder and others, 1993, p. 63).

This group of Air Force officers saw the Air Force as a "military servant of the nation" and felt that the service's "view of itself and its desirable capabilities should change" according to the changing needs of the nation (Builder and others, 1993, p. 64). These thoughts could be summarized with a vision of a "properly configured" Air Force that provided America with a broad spectrum of abilities, including both combat and non-traditional roles, to be used as necessary (Builder and others, 1993, p. 63).

The proponents of non-traditional missions also point out the positive benefits to the military itself, in addition to the effect on national security. For example, Barnes claims that:

By creating an effective military capability to provide civic action, H/CA [humanitarian and civic assistance], and disaster relief . . . , the U.S. will be better able to protect its security interests in peacetime, while insuring the readiness of its wartime military capability. (Barnes, 1989, p. 40)

To further develop the idea of multimission services, the next section discusses the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has a long history of service, military and otherwise, and an approach to non-traditional mission tasking that is somewhat different than that of the DOD services.

D. THE COAST GUARD: MODEL FOR DOD?

The United States Coast Guard is a military organization whose history and experiences might serve as an example for DOD's future. While the majority of the Coast Guard's

missions are civilian in nature and the service is part of the Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard is designated in law as a branch of the armed forces of the United States (Stubbs, 1992) and has ably served in most of the nation's wars. The Coast Guard has the same personnel rank and rating structure as the U.S. Navy, and the service shares the same pay scale as the DOD services along with many other similarities.

Just as the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have a singular mission they hold dearest, so does the Coast Guard. As discussed previously, in DOD this primary purpose is "combat, to deter and defeat enemies of the United States." (Huntington, 1993, p. 43) Although some may go back to the Coast Guard's roots and the establishment of the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790 to regard law enforcement as their primary purpose (Larzelere, 1993), most would disagree. In the words of Admiral Robert Kramek, Commandant of the Coast Guard:

The fundamental essence of the Coast Guard is our role as lifesavers and guardians of the sea. That has been our tradition for 200 years. It is the thing that gives our people the most gratification--rescuing people who might otherwise die. . . . That is the bedrock mission. In my view, search and rescue would be the last mission ever to leave the Coast Guard. (Kramek, 1995, p. 60)

As has been pointed out, the U.S. military has been involved in countless roles and missions other than the one it considers primary. The same is also true of the Coast Guard. However, a difference emerges when we contrast Coast Guard and DOD perceptions of their "other" missions. A widely-held opinion in DOD maintains that noncombat-related activities are unnecessary distractions to the primary warfighting mission. On the other hand, while saving lives may be the primary

mission of the Coast Guard, the service has always considered itself a multi-mission service (Kime, 1993).

In addition to embracing the concept of multiple missions, the Coast Guard has seen great changes in the nature of its missions over the years. Service directives list the four primary roles of the Coast Guard as maritime safety (including search and rescue), maritime law enforcement, marine environmental protection, and national security (Coast Guard, 1995). Specific missions within these broad areas ebb and flow with the needs of the presidential administration and nation. For instance, in 1957 the Coast Guard had cutters on weather station in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, personnel manning Loran A navigation stations around the world, and wooden patrol boats on harbor entrance patrols examining merchant vessels entering U.S. ports (Larzelere, 1993). None of these missions now exist.

Other missions have come to the fore. In the 1980s, the Coast Guard became a major player performing drug interdiction in the Reagan-Bush War on Drugs. By fiscal 1989, drug interdiction efforts accounted for nearly 24 percent of the Coast Guard's Operating Expenses (OE) budget (Landry, 1994). However, as experience, DOD participation, better intelligence, and greater agency coordination combined to change drug trafficker's methods and the nature of the Drug War (Kaufman, 1993), drug interdiction's share of the OE budget decreased to less than ten percent by fiscal 1995. In its place, during the same time span, Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (Haitian, Cuban, and Chinese) grew from around seven percent of OE to nearly 12 percent, and fisheries law enforcement to protect depleted fish stocks doubled to 15 percent of the OE budget (Landry, 1994). Passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, following the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster, has brought about continuous growth

in Coast Guard marine environmental protection duties (Hessman, 1993).

Admiral J. William Kime, Commandant of the Coast Guard from 1990 until 1994, made the following statement about change:

The multimissioned flexibility of the Coast Guard has served us well in absorbing the impact of . . . rapid change, while retaining our trademark poise and professionalism in responding to national crises on a moment's notice. . . . The Coast Guard has always adapted well to change. Throughout its history, and into its third century of service, the Coast Guard has and will continue to use this adaptability to define and redefine itself and its mission. Change has kept us in sync with the needs of the public we serve. (Kime, 1993, p. 59)

Admiral Kramek, while Coast Guard Chief of Staff in 1993 (before his appointment to Commandant), stated:

What makes us valuable is this great flexibility, this multi-mission ability that we have, and that is why we are not being reduced, and that is why we are being supported. (Kaufman, 1993, p. 34)

The lesson to be learned by DOD is that changing to meet the needs of the nation can be desirable and advantageous. Change has served to keep the Coast Guard relevant to America's needs. However, multi-mission ability can have its drawbacks in a world with limited resources. In 1982, the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) reported that a Coast Guard "unable . . . to fill all of its statutory responsibilities" needed a combination of task narrowing, resource expansion, and an "altered approach" to performing its tasks (U.S. NACOA, 1983, p. 27).

Although the Coast Guard has been relatively successful at protecting its budget in recent years, the added mission responsibilities continue to cause problems. When the Coast Guard "surges" to respond to a crisis, such as the flood of Haitian immigrants in the 1990s with the resultant Operation

Able Manner, it "places a serious strain on our [the Coast Guard's] ability to respond to other incidents. Maintenance of our resources is also strained due to the increased pace of operations." (Larzelere, 1994, p. 25) Cutter and aircraft operational programming were exceeded by 10 to 15 and 5 percent, respectively, and dockside and shipyard availability (maintenance) periods were delayed (Larzelere, 1994). Admiral Kramek is concerned that "we are going to work them [Coast Guard personnel] so hard that they are not going to be happy, productive employees any more." (Kramek, 1994, p.12)

The Coast Guard is currently conducting a "streamlining" study in an effort to reorganize, use, and manage resources more efficiently (Coast Guard, 1994). With steady downward pressure on budgets and no sign of reduced mission demand, these efforts are perhaps the only available recourse. There is another clear lesson here for DOD: if new responsibilities are not accompanied by adequate funding, personnel, and equipment, then the military faces dangers that could compromise its present capabilities. These issues are discussed in greater detail in the next section.

E. BUDGETARY AND READINESS ISSUES

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm raised questions about the Total Forces concept and availability of the reserves. Although performance of reserve components in support roles was generally rated positively, none of the National Guard "round-out" combat units was ever deployed to the combat area (Moskos, 1994). However, others feel that this last fact may have been due more to Army regulars' negative perceptions of the Guard's combat abilities and note that Marine Corps combat reserve performance in the Gulf was deemed superb (Walker, 1992).

Some support the shifting of an even higher percentage of the military support and combat support roles to the reserves. These observers argue that if the reserves are not going to be used for combat, then they should be used primarily for support duties. These support duties are well-suited for providing assistance in many non-traditional missions, as well. The proponents of this strategy go even further in saying that this approach should figure into justifications for force structure and budget. (Brehm and Gray, 1992)

Regardless, calls for National Guard roles "other than active force backup" such as "maintaining domestic order, disaster relief, and youth training" have either been "reemphasized" or introduced in recent years (Moskos, 1994, p. 141). As previously observed, active-duty and reserve component involvement in non-traditional missions has risen since the end of the Cold War. However, this greater involvement in largely unplanned actions has had an adverse effect on the military budget. The ramifications of the unfunded costs of these operations can be severe, as Patricia Irvin has stated:

These [humanitarian operations] represent large, unbudgeted expenses for the Defense Department. Unless a way is developed to pay for them, the result could be reductions in training, force structure, modernization and quality of life for our troops--all of which could translate into reduced readiness. Clearly an immediate solution to this problem is essential. (Irvin, 1994, p. 3)

While speaking specifically of humanitarian operations, Irvin's statement applies to the broad spectrum of non-traditional missions, and the budget problems resulting from the present funding mechanism may have a harmful effect on readiness.

For example, in a slide briefing to the Roles and Missions Commission on September 14, 1994, the Army stated the following:

The primary difficulty with operations other than war lies in the loss of funds required to sustain readiness. For contingency operations so far in 1994 alone, there is a \$120 million dollar shortfall to the Army. Diverting funds from one Army program or budget line to pay for these operations degrades Army readiness. These resource challenges have not been adequately addressed in the past. The increased frequency of these missions and the Army's ability to carry them out dictate a recognition that operations other than war must be sufficiently resourced to maintain and improve our abilities in this area in the future. (Department of the Army, 1994)

Congress at least partially addressed the immediate situation by approving a \$3.1 billion supplement in the spring of 1995. However, only \$51.6 million of this sum was earmarked for the reserves who estimate to have spent nearly \$1.3 billion on unplanned operations in Cuba, Haiti, Iraq, and Rwanda. The financial shortfalls resulting from these unexpected missions have caused unfunded equipment maintenance to rise from \$49 million in 1993 to \$239 million in 1995. (Matthews, 1995)

With the current U.S. policies of engagement and enlargement, it appears that the U.S. will continue to become involved in unplanned contingency operations to achieve national goals. Bearing this in mind, one must compare the cost of unilateral action to that of U.N. or coalition operations. If the U.S. chooses to participate in U.N.-led operations, the price tag is much lower (U.S. President, 1995). For example, the U.S. paid 85 percent of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, but pays roughly 31 percent of a U.N.-led mission (Linn, 1993).

Additionally, U.N. forces have replaced U.S. troops in operations in Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. This has allowed American military personnel to return to the U.S. safely and resume planned activities. (U.S. President, 1995)

It should also be noted that the relative costs of most non-traditional mission areas are quite small when compared with the whole defense budget. For example, the total cost to the U.S. of U.N. peacekeeping efforts in fiscal 1994 was less than one-half of one percent of DOD's budget (U.S. President, 1995).

However, Samuel Huntington sees another budgetary danger stemming from increased acceptance of non-traditional missions. Huntington fears that, while all acknowledge that the defense budget is declining, the share of purely military funding will decrease faster than funding for non-traditional missions, which may be more popular and politically acceptable. The result could be inadequate combat forces. (Huntington, 1993)

In other words, even though operations such as peacekeeping may account for only a fraction of the total defense budget, the sum of all non-traditional mission costs may become significant, particularly when expenditures for Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) environmental clean-up and other related actions, non-defense items in the DOD budget, defense manufacturer conversion funding, and the like are also competing for a piece of the military dollar (Congressional Budget Office, 1995). Policy makers will need to look across the entire spectrum of demands upon the military when deciding what missions to perform.

Another issue with readiness and budgetary ramifications is training for non-traditional missions. Some believe that "general purpose" units will be able to handle most of these missions, while others feel that specialized training or even dedicated units may be necessary to conduct these actions (Rosenau, 1994). The decision could be expensive in more ways than one.

An avenue suggested by some is a limitation on the type of non-traditional mission support provided. By restricting

U.S. involvement to training, logistics, lift (transportation), and command, control, communications, and intelligence, the U.S. could reduce the impact on readiness and the budget. (Ullman, 1995)

A more expansive approach involves more efficient use of American forces. U.S. Navy Admiral Paul David Miller is an advocate of using the military as both a "sword and a plowshare." (Miller, 1993, p. 14) To allow leaders to appropriately tailor the selection of forces for each mission, he advises a capability-based military force structure instead of the Cold War-style, threat-based military (Miller, 1993). The recent development and use of the Adaptive Joint Force Package concept is an example of the military getting "the most from investments already made" rather than doing "more with less." (Miller, 1994, p. 12)

A panel of the 1992 National Defense University symposium on non-traditional missions made the following recommendations:

- Rebalance military missions and priorities. Do not assume that the capabilities required for non-traditional roles are any less than those required for traditional missions;
- Conduct long-term planning for non-traditional missions; and
- Ensure greater interagency coordination occurs. (Graham, 1993, p. 124)

The clear lesson here is that non-traditional missions should not be performed "out of hide." Aside from the relative merits of conducting these "other" missions, the impact on military readiness and budgets cannot be overstated. If the American military is to engage in more non-traditional missions, the nation's civilian leadership must provide the necessary funding, personnel, and equipment for both the traditional and non-traditional missions.

Several recent studies have concluded that overall military readiness has not yet suffered, but there is a definite potential for future degradation (Congressional Budget Office, 1995). Secretary of Defense William Perry, for example, has expressed concern that military readiness and morale might shrink over time (Austen, 1994). A positive sign was the December 1994 announcement by President Clinton that he plans to pursue a total of \$25 billion more in the defense budget spread over the period fiscal 1996 to fiscal 2001 (Congressional Budget Office, 1995). Congressional interest in the ongoing debate over non-traditional missions is considered in the next section.

F. THE ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which is known primarily for placing requirements on DOD for more "jointness" between the services, was passed by Congress in 1986. This legislation also stipulated that, at least every three years, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) review the roles and functions of the military and issue a report with recommended changes. This requirement was aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the armed forces. (GAO 1993, GAO/NSIAD-93-200)

The first report was issued in 1989 and is not particularly germane to the subject of this paper. The 1993 report was submitted by General Colin Powell. In the report, the terms "roles," "missions," and "functions" were defined as follows to show the distinction between them.

- Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the services were established by Congress in law;
- Missions are the tasks assigned to the combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs) by the President or Secretary of Defense; and

- Functions are specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable the services to execute their roles. (Department of Defense, 1993, p. iv)

The report went on to show the interrelationship of the terms with the statement "the primary function of the Services is to provide forces organized, trained, and equipped to perform a role--to be employed by a CINC in the accomplishment of a mission." (Department of Defense, 1993, p. iv.)

The report deals mainly with attempts to eliminate unnecessary duplication and redundancy between the services. While these topics are somewhat outside the primary scope of this paper, the report did touch somewhat upon non-traditional missions. Counter-drug operations were acknowledged as an expanded mission area for DOD. Additionally, a new CINC for American forces stationed in the continental U.S. was established with planned responsibilities to include providing assistance to domestic authorities after disasters and supporting U.N. peacekeeping efforts. (Department of Defense, 1993)

Members of Congress generally felt that the report did not go far enough in suggesting recommendations in light of the changes in national security needs and the decline in defense spending brought about by the end of the Cold War (U.S. Congress, House 1993). A 1993 GAO study concluded that the 1993 report was an improvement over the 1989 report and did make some important recommendations. GAO also concurred with the prevailing opinion in Congress that the report had not gone into enough depth. Among the GAO comments was a finding that the report did not examine the new important missions of the post-Cold War era in enough detail. (GAO 1993, GAO/NSIAD-93-200)

In May 1994, as a result of its continued dissatisfaction with the 1993 report, Congress directed that DOD establish a commission to examine U.S. military roles and missions. The

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces was formed in response to this directive (Federal Register, 1994). The commission also became known as the "White Commission," after its chairman, John White.

The mandate of the White Commission was to:

- Review the appropriateness of existing service role, mission, and function allocations for the post-Cold War era;
- Evaluate and report on alternative distribution of these allocations among the services; and
- Recommend changes to the existing definitions and allocation of military roles, missions, and functions. (Federal Register, 1994)

The overriding purpose of the Commission on Roles and Missions was seen as eliminating redundancy and streamlining force structure to allow the most effective future military possible. However, some members of Congress were known to view the procedure as a means to reduce the defense budget and provide an additional "peace dividend." (Yost, 1994) Proponents of the military services were alarmed by this possibility. For example, the president of the Navy League of the United States, during an invited session with the commission, specifically and strongly addressed dangers he and his organization perceived in cutting military spending purely as a budgetary tool (Baker, 1994).

In preparation for release of the commission's report, armed forces planning personnel were developing papers defending the need for roles and missions seen as likely to be cut (Yost, 1994). Interservice rivalries also resulted in calls from the services to retain their respective missions and assets at the expense of another service's resources (Holzer, 1995).

Preliminary information from the commission indicated that, in addition to the major missions of the services, they

were also looking at who was performing non-traditional missions. John White had remarked that the nation should not "automatically turn to the military" and that other government agencies should have the wherewithal to respond to emergencies. (Matthews, 1994, p. 11)

Commentary about a draft of the commission's report to Congress surfaced in late April of 1995. These assessments indicated that the "services emerge relatively unscathed from the roles and missions debate." (Glashow and Holzer, 1995, p. 1) A Marine source stated that there was "nothing very substantial" in the draft report, and an Air Force Major General felt that "the commission has been unable, for a variety of reasons, to address the interservice disagreement about warfighting doctrine." (Glashow and Holzer, 1995, p. 1) Bob Gaskin of Business Executives for National Security, a group that advocates a leaner military, said "The commission ducked the hard issues. Political pressure prevailed. They plowed no new ground." (Pexton, 1995, p. 8)

Some of the draft report recommendations include privatization of portions of the defense support function, further "jointness" among the services (Pexton, 1995), and fuller integration of the reserves with their active-duty counterparts (Glashow and Holzer, 1995). Additionally, the commission is said to have concluded "that, like it or not, the military must expect and be prepared for more peacekeeping and other operations short of war in the next 20 years." (Pexton, 1995, p. 8)

It appeared from these comments that the commission would advocate "greater focus on adjusting each service's core mission to include studying how each can contribute more to overseas presence and peacekeeping operations." (Glashow and Holzer, 1995, p. 14) The commission was also expected to suggest improved integration and coordination of all agencies involved in national security with the thought that some

missions such as immigration control might be better handled by the State or Justice departments instead of the military. (Pexton, 1995).

The commission's final report was submitted to Congress on May 24, 1995. As expected, the commission chose a different tack for their report. Stating that the question was no longer "who does what," but how are the necessary capabilities provided for joint commanders, the report concentrated on three areas: effective unified military operations, efficient and responsive support, and improved management and direction. (Department of Defense, 1995)

With respect to non-traditional missions, the commission concluded that "the U.S. Military will be called on to perform a broader array of missions in more diverse contingency situations than they did in the past while still maintaining a capability for large-scale regional conflicts." (Department of Defense, 1995, p. vii) Another statement from the report along these lines was that DOD "faces an unclear future marked by rapid change, diverse contingencies, limited budgets, and a broad range of missions to support evolving national security policies." (Department of Defense, 1995, p. 1-1)

The commission saw the following missions as emerging and growing in importance: combatting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, peace operations, and operations other than war (OOTW). These missions are areas where "DOD must expand capabilities but without sacrificing its ability to fight the Nation's wars." (Department of Defense, 1995, p. ES-4)

The potential importance of peace operations in preventing situations from reaching the stage where American forces would be needed for combat was the grounds for separating peace operations from the rest of the OOTW category. The commission felt that peace operations should be given a higher priority than currently assigned, and that

specific training and equipment were appropriate. Integration of resources with, and use of, other agencies and adequate funding so as to not interfere with readiness were also stressed. (Department of Defense, 1995)

Operations other than war were recognized as "appropriate in circumstances where speed is essential or other capabilities are not available." (Department of Defense, 1995, p. 2-17) While the commission recommended that DOD should assign proper priorities to OOTW and integrate OOTW capabilities into overall planning, limited use of military forces in favor of civilian agency response was preferable. (Department of Defense, 1995)

Another White Commission recommendation called for an increase in planning and preparation for coalition operations, and additional funding for the Military-to-Military Contact and International Military Education and Training programs. (Department of Defense, 1995)

The report also recommended that reserve components be sized and shaped more in line with national strategy needs, integrated more with the active duty components, and receive better training and evaluation. Reserve forces in excess of needs were recommended for elimination. (Department of Defense, 1995)

The final ramifications of the White Commission's recommendations remain to be seen. Congress must still review and act (or refrain from acting) upon the roles and missions issues. However, the report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces may have a long-term bearing on the mission focus, both traditional and non-traditional, of America's armed forces as well as the manner in which support functions and planning are conducted.

G. SIGNS OF CHANGE

As far back as 1991, military leaders praised the positive benefits of increasing non-traditional missions. In his 1991 report to Congress, then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that the "humanitarian and civic assistance programs of the Department of Defense have significantly advanced U.S. national security objectives, . . . assisted people in need in over 40 nations and strengthened our security relationships with friendly governments." (Morrison, 1991, p. 1260). The Joint Chiefs of Staff were quoted in their 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment report as noting that nation-building and similar activities "extend our political good will and access to foreign markets." (Morrison, 1991, p. 1260) Also, then Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice said that "humanitarian operations in response to disasters . . . play a role in supporting U.S. national security objectives by providing foreign populations with a favorable image of the United States." (Morrison, 1991, p. 1260)

In their January 1993 report for fiscal 1992, the Reserve Forces Policy Board made the following statement:

Roles that received less emphasis during the Cold War are now becoming more important. These roles include an expanded civil affairs capability, drug interdiction or eradication, drug demand reduction, youth education and training programs, environmental education, and nation building. Each Reserve component has capabilities which can be effectively used within these mission areas. Using the Reserve components for these types of missions can also be an effective national policy. (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1993, p. xvi)

This board went further to recommend that the domestic missions mentioned be "formally" assigned to the Reserve components along with increased involvement in the other areas (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1993).

In the 1993 Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, DOD "policies and activities" were said to "have been adjusted to cope with the security requirements of the post-Cold War world (Department of Defense, 1993, p. 22). The individual sections dedicated to each of the services also spoke, in part, of conducting non-traditional missions in response to the changing world (Department of Defense, 1993).

As mentioned previously, the current versions of both the National Security Strategy (U.S. President, 1995) and the National Military Strategy (U.S. Department of Defense, 1995) address the importance of non-traditional missions in furthering the goals of the nation. In addition to policy changes, it appears the U.S. has learned from recent past mistakes during non-traditional missions as well.

Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, has stated that there are two criteria for determining whether or not to use the armed services in a humanitarian emergency. First, the situation must have a "clear purpose" for military involvement and an "achievable objective." (Holmes 1995, p. 30) Second, the situation must be severe enough so that the normal relief agencies cannot handle it and thus there is an "urgent" need for military forces. If these conditions are satisfied, DOD resources would be utilized with the intent to replace them with other relief agencies whenever feasible (Holmes, 1995). These thoughts echo earlier statements by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs, Patricia Irvin (Irvin, 1994).

In April 1995, Defense Secretary William J. Perry spoke of the need for wisdom in determining appropriate responses in the post-Cold War world. Perry stated that the decision-making process for use of the military had political, military, and ethical elements, and that the armed forces

should not be the tool of choice for every humanitarian crisis. The Defense Secretary used the large-scale, short-notice, yet limited, military airlift for Rwanda as an example in stipulating the following four criteria for involvement of U.S. forces:

- Situation involves a natural or manmade catastrophe that dwarfs the response capabilities of normal relief agencies;
- Urgent need for relief that only the military has the ability to initiate;
- The relief response requires resources only the military has; and
- There is minimal risk to the lives of U.S. military personnel. (Perry, 1995, p. 37)

Secretary Perry used similar logic in explaining the decision to refrain from becoming part of the current U.N. peace operations in Bosnia. His position was that the price of achieving peace in the region would necessitate far too many casualties and too high a cost for the benefit to American national interest (Summers, 1995). He went on to say:

Our use of force . . . will be selective and limited, reflecting the relative importance of the outcome to our interest. We have a whole range of options. They go from using U.S. military assets for logistical operations to using U.S. combat forces. The decision of what to use . . . will reflect the cost we are willing to pay to achieve the outcome we want. . . . Our interests should dictate where we get involved and the extent of military involvement. (Summers, 1995, p. 15)

The lesson of experience, primarily from the difficulties in Somalia, appears to be the recognition of limits. The U.S. has hopefully learned the value of considering the "big picture" before setting out on a course of action.

A recent statement from the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, indicates a recognition of the balance that must be reached between obvious needs and resource limitations. General Shalikashvili stated:

. . . there are some in the Pentagon who'd be very happy if I put outside a sign that read, "We only do the big ones." The notion that we exist, first and foremost, to fight our nation's wars is something I subscribe to. But I also say, "In this new world, we cannot deny our Government a very important tool to try to manage crises, bring stability to an area, deal with operations that overwhelm traditional humanitarian organizations." But you have to be selective--or you could fritter away resources and capabilities. (Dreifus, 1995, p. 37)

This chapter has portrayed the current issues surrounding non-traditional missions and, particularly evident in the growth and learning documented in this last section, the viewpoints of today's political and military administrations. The next, and final, chapter consolidates and summarizes the various aspects of the non-traditional mission debate. Lessons "learned" from the research and analysis are presented along with final thoughts on the future of non-traditional missions in the U.S. military.

VI. OVERALL ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS

A. SUMMARY

This paper has presented the evidence of past and present U.S. military involvement in non-traditional missions. An examination of current issues has also been included with the premise that the overall thesis "package" would serve as a means for an educated discussion of the future of these "other" missions. Still, some might ask, why the military?

One answer to the question can be found in a recent RAND report:

- The military is uniquely trained and equipped for hazardous duty;
- The military can often provide a political and/or strategic benefit when used in "nontraditional" missions; and
- The military can bring a broad scope of capabilities and organizational structures into areas and situations where ordinary civil institutions may no longer be functioning. (Lempert and others, 1993, p. vi)

In other words, the military is used because they can be counted on to complete large scale, difficult jobs that other organizations would be unable to do in an adequate or timely manner.

Furthermore, James Fallows has noted the long-time use of the U.S. military for advancing "the notion of the common good:"

The military, strangely, is the one government institution that has been assigned the legitimacy to act on its notion of the collective good. 'National Defense' can make us do things--train engineers, build highways--that the long-term good

of the nation or common sense cannot. (Fallows, 1991, p. 20)

However, other, more contentious questions revolve around the issue of the proper role of America's military. As alluded to earlier, one school of thought has emerged which portrays increases in the performance of non-traditional missions as movement down a long dark road ending in disaster for the military and the nation. An eloquent example of this argument is Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.'s "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." This fictional essay is a cautionary tale where the military becomes heavily involved in non-traditional missions. In the end, the primacy of civilian control of the military dissolves, and the armed forces take over control of the nation (Dunlap, 1992). Dunlap's article has even been used to defend positions in other papers advocating a strict focus on warfighting duties only (Baranzini, 1993).

Dunlap's essay, along with a later effort entitled "The Last American Warrior: Non-Traditional Missions and the Decline of the U.S. Armed Forces," (Dunlap, 1994) call attention to the possible dangers implicit in a policy that ignores military readiness and combat preparation. The articles are based on the premise that America will conduct non-traditional missions to the exclusion of training for combat purposes. Although interesting reading, a more balanced account of the issues and concerns is more useful to our discussion than one-sided position pieces.

It is not reasonable to assume, as Dunlap has speculated, that the U.S. will blindly turn its back on armed forces' combat missions as it charges off to make the country and world a better place. Current activities and plans for the future must reach an equilibrium between force size and structure, funding, operational tempo, service to the world and nation, and warfighting readiness. The military services

and civil authorities, such as the Executive branch and Congress, both have too much power and too great a stake in the outcome to expect a large change favoring either traditional or non-traditional missions at the expense of the other. The recent development of criteria for involvement and restraint in Rwanda and Bosnia are sure signs of this balance of power in action.

The overwhelming fact must be realized that concepts of potential global dangers and national security have changed. And America must evolve with them. One panel of the 1992 National Defense University symposium concluded that:

. . . the national security community must recognize the usefulness of non-traditional missions. The task of the military is to provide for the common defense. In today's world all the instruments of military power must be utilized, to include those of a non-traditional nature. (Graham, 1993, p. 124)

One strategy analyst has taken this idea of utility even further to look at the relationship among the military, national productivity, and the economy. Colonel David Shaver has talked about a "balanced strategy" where the military is "able to respond to a wide array of policy options" while, at the same time, being utilized "in peacetime for purposes which increase American productivity." (Shaver, 1990, p. 25) He has also developed a model for integrating the U.S. economic and military might to improve the country's competitiveness (Shaver, 1990).

Other analysts have addressed issues related to the downsizing of the U.S. military. On the matter of balancing missions with decreased military size and budget, Bernard Trainor, retired Marine Corps General and current director of the National Security Program at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, has stated:

They [supporters of a drastically decreased military force size] are of a belief that we can

have a far smaller military force because the dangers are less, and we can afford to be involved in these [humanitarian] interventions. But there is a very interesting corollary to this which you might want to think about. If you accept the fact that the United States is not going to be involved in these . . . efforts, you can have a small but very high-tech military trained for combat and combat alone. On the other hand--and this is where these people get caught--extensive humanitarian efforts are not technology-intensive. They are manpower intensive, and manpower always costs more than technology. If that is what you want, if you have forsaken the possibility of violent war or said it is unlikely and the major post-cold-war mission of the U.S. military is going to be in humanitarian-type operations, that means you are going to have a large military because humanitarian intervention requires manpower more than technology. And if it is manpower-intensive, it is going to be expensive. (Trainer, 1995, p. 14)

These thoughts bring back the example of the U.S. Coast Guard. A Coast Guard commander recently compared DOD and the Coast Guard with the comment "faced with increasing pressure to downsize, other service branches fear becoming a hollow force. The Coast Guard fears being perceived as all things to all people." (Landry, 1994, p. 73) If DOD continues to become more involved in non-traditional missions, it too could come to be seen as the solution to too many of the nation's problems.

One key is the use of coalitions and multilateral action to alleviate this situation somewhat. At least in the international arena, the U.S. should continue to build and use its alliances. As John Galvin has stated:

The military must be ready for both traditional and non-traditional roles. To guarantee national security and foster a peaceful and prosperous world in which to conduct trade and commerce, these roles can be expected to play a large part in collective action. This does not abrogate U.S. leadership through collective action. In fact, it strengthens the binding that the United

States has with other nations. (Galvin, 1993, p. 118)

Even though America will benefit from the burden- and cost-sharing of collective action, the nation's political leadership needs to examine the broader picture. Increasing the capabilities and use of other U.S. agencies may be appropriate in some areas. As a further precaution, the concept of real-world limitations must always be considered. In the words of Frank Wisner, while serving as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1993:

We need also to recognize that not every problem has a solution. We do not have the resources or the desire to intervene in every situation in which groups are fighting or in which people are suffering. We will have to make hard choices about our interests and capabilities.

There is an emerging consensus that, in each case, we will have to ask some tough questions about the nature of a threat There is unlikely ever to be a strict formula for obtaining the right answers (Wisner, 1993, p. 1)

It is imperative that guidelines incorporating these "tough questions" be used before a decision to commit U.S. military resources is made.

One area that must be addressed is the role of the reserve component. Wallace Earl Walker, Army Colonel and a professor of public policy at West Point, has stated that reserve forces are the "linchpin of the armed forces" because of their presence in local communities and ability to foster support for the military in general and its manpower and resources (Walker, 1992, p. 315). Walker also states that the reserves will "provide the combat support and combat-service support needed for the fast-breaking low- and mid-intensity conflicts that will dominate future contingencies" and that both combat and support reserves will be the "mainstay of U.S. preparation for general war scenarios." (Walker, 1992, p. 315)

In the downsized military of today, the reserves are more involved in almost all types of operations. Additionally, many of the suggestions for non-traditional missions call for action by support and combat support specialties located in the reserve components (Brehm and Gray, 1992). Better availability of reserve forces could alleviate increased operational tempos found in some active duty units (Terry, 1994). However, as previously noted, there are restrictions on the use of reserves in certain instances (GAO 1993, NSIAD-93-180), and some reserve units are already tasked at high levels (Terry, 1994). The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald R. Fogleman, sees the "goal" as finding "smarter ways to use our [military] people and assets" to allow "everybody to share the workload." (Fogleman, 1995, p. 5)

Any increase in the use of reserves must also consider the adverse effects on civilian employers and their employees in the reserve components (Terry, 1994). Difficulties arising from possible dilemmas in this area could hold consequences for recruiting and retention. Although a resolution of the reserve issue is a necessity, a compromise to please both the military and civilian sectors calls for sensible limitations on levels of reserve activation.

Finally, it is proper that the military arrive at its own consensus about non-traditional roles and missions. A unified armed forces would be better positioned to formulate, voice, and defend their stand on the issue. As the authors of a recent RAND report dealing with non-traditional missions concluded, "if the services do not resolve the issue for themselves, it seems likely that it will be resolved for them by budgets and mandates imposed from without." (Builder and others 1993, p. 64) The recent report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces could be a precursor to this type of edict.

B. LESSONS LEARNED

As a result of the research and analysis undertaken for the paper, the following "lessons" are offered as a basis for continued involvement of the U.S. military in non-traditional missions:

- Non-traditional missions are a traditional use of the U.S. military, and have been throughout the history of the nation;
- America's armed forces exist to provide for the nation's security, and to defend the people's conception of national interests;
- The truly global nature of today's world has broadened the concept of national security and defense to include economic and environmental dangers in addition to purely military threats;
- The U.S. military must change along with the changing needs of the nation;
- The capabilities and resources of the armed forces can benefit the nation at home and abroad through active support of the policy of engagement;
- It is appropriate to use the U.S. military for a myriad of non-traditional missions in the defense of broadened national security interests;
- Non-traditional missions should not be performed at the expense of armed forces' combat effectiveness;
- The military must be properly funded, sized, and equipped with the ability to perform both traditional and non-traditional missions;
- Budgets must provide funding "up front" so that contingencies are not paid for at the expense of planned operations and maintenance;
- Operational tempo must be controlled to balance the need for non-traditional missions with the requirements for readiness, so that sufficient readiness is maintained;

- Regulations and planning for use of reserve forces must be revamped for more effective availability of reserves to perform support functions;
- Military leadership must instill a sense or understanding of the importance of non-traditional missions into personnel, addressing education, doctrine, and attitude;
- Leaders need to consider use of other agencies or coalitions in addition to the armed forces when responding to situations; and
- Political and military leadership must recognize resource limitations and be selective in choices for engagement.

C. FINAL THOUGHTS

There is little doubt or contention that DOD is in the midst of a change in mission focus that began, for all intents and purposes, in 1989. It is the conclusion here that the new focus should concentrate on the so called "non-traditional" missions along with the policy of engagement. As has been illustrated, a very strong case can be made that these missions have been an important, and sometimes dominant, part of the military's past service to America. Non-traditional missions can be an important part of the present and future service of the military as well.

The military exists to defend the nation. While some narrow this definition to strictly a combat role, a broader scope would undoubtedly better serve the interests of America and its people. There is no mistaking that the military must be prepared for combat. However, the armed forces must also respond to the needs of the country. Currently, these needs mean involvement in the non-traditional missions such as disaster response, humanitarian aid, civic and social action, peace operations, and the like. The military, along with other government agencies, must play its part in America's

efforts for greater peace and stability through engagement. That said, the nation must be prepared to pay the costs of such efforts. The military can, and will, perform these "new" missions in an admirable manner, but "robbing Peter to pay Paul" must be avoided at all costs. DOD must be properly funded and sized for both traditional and non-traditional missions, and proper oversight must prevent mission overload.

The following quotation summarizes the situation in which the U.S. military finds itself today.

The American military is poised at a crossroads, looking ahead but still unsure about where it wants to go or how to get there. The only constants are that all roads have their share of punishing curves, and all lead to change. Change has never come easily for the military, which is firmly rooted in the past. But it must change, and it will change in a relatively rapid and radical way. (Eitelberg and Mehay 1994, p. 233)

Perhaps this change will occur through the American military's rediscovery of its roots in non-traditional missions as it pursues the nation's policy of engagement.

APPENDIX A. NATIONAL GUARD PERFORMANCE OF NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS, 1973-1994

FY	Call -ups	Total		Civil Disturbance Control						Disaster & Other Response ¹					
		# of States	# of Troops	# of Total	# of States	# of Troops	# of Public		# of States	# of Troops	# of States	# of Troops	Disaster	Other	
							Strike	Other ²							
73	155	--	31089	11	7	8321	--	--	--	144	36	22768	--	--	
74	206	--	39691	25	18	21139	4	21	21	181	37	18552	134	47	
75	Not available; FY 76 report covers 15 month period due transition from JUL FY to OCT FY.														
76+	232	48	21600	16	11	7004	2	14	14	216	47	14605	102	114	
77	229	46	19737	9	8	5605	2	7	7	220	44	13889	96	124	
78	294	47	31477	22	12	5970	--	--	--	272	47	25507	116	154	
79	320	48	39829	27	17	19729	--	--	--	293	48	20100	146	147	
80	305	42	26895	20	16	10722	5	15	15	286	40	16173	110	176	
81	374	43	20843	14	11	5122	--	--	--	360	40	15721	87	273	
82	390	52	10164	6	6	492	--	--	--	284	52	8453	100	284	
83	511	48	10630	10	10	1112	--	--	--	501	--	9518	129	372	
84	391	49	10821	8	4	501	--	--	--	383	--	10320	129	254	
85	614	48	20731	4	4	240	--	4	4	610	--	20491	131	479	
86	531	46	12238	2	2	1059	--	2	2	529	--	11179	140	389	
87	428	50	33998	4	3	2217	--	--	--	424	--	31781	130	294	
88	352	52	8000+	1	1	--	--	--	--	351	--	---	72	279	
89	249	53	14566	4	--	--	--	--	--	245	--	---	53	192	
90	292	38	23171	6	--	--	--	--	--	286	--	---	77	209	
91	337	42	7848	1	1	--	--	--	--	336	--	---	76	260	
92	322	51	27782	4	--	--	--	--	--	318	--	---	112	206	
93	320	47	34052	3	--	--	--	--	--	317	--	---	106	211	
94	402	48	27801	--	--	--	--	--	--	---	--	---	--	---	

Source: Adapted from Annual Review of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, FYs 1973-1994.

¹ Natural disasters include floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, forest fires, earthquakes, various storms, and volcanic eruptions. "Other" includes search & rescue, medevacs, water hauls (drought), traffic safety, chemical spills, power restoration, & miscellaneous missions.

² Other civil disturbances include civil unrest, strikes, blockades, demonstrations, prison disorders, assists to law enforcement, and potential civil disorders.

³ Dashed lines (--) in the table indicate the information was not available.

**APPENDIX B. AIR FORCE SUPPORT OF NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS,
1973-1989**

Year	Description of Mission
1973	Flood relief to Pakistan
1974	Earthquake relief to Guatemala
1975	Earthquake relief to Turkey Flood relief to Romania
1976	Transport of rescue teams/equipment to Kentucky mine disaster
1977	Snow removal relief to Buffalo, New York
1978	Support in recovery of bodies from Jonestown cult mass suicides Evacuation of American citizens from Iran
1979	Support to Nuclear Regulatory Agency for Three-Mile Island
1980	Earthquake relief to Terceira Island, Algeria, and Italy Cuban refugees to processing centers throughout the U.S.
1982	Delivery of foodstuffs to famine-stricken areas of Chad Earthquake relief to Yeman Arab Republic
1983	Humanitarian assistance to El Salvador Earthquake relief to Turkey
1984	Medical equipment and supplies to Zaire for AIDS research Relief assistance to Ethiopian refugees in Sudan
1985	Famine relief to Niger, Mali, and Ethiopia Earthquake relief to Mexico City
1986	Typhoon relief to Solomon Islands Earthquake relief to El Salvador
1987	Earthquake relief to Ecuador Excess DOD property to Chad and Thailand
1988	Flood relief to Bangladesh after 30 million left homeless Earthquake relief to Armenia

Source: Adapted from Military Airlift Command Office of History,
Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: An Illustrated History of the
Military Airlift Command, 1941-1991, 1991.

APPENDIX C. CURRENT CIVIL MILITARY-PROGRAMS

This appendix contains more detailed information on the range of Civil-Military programs overseen by the Directorate of Civil-Military Programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The information is divided into the two categories of programs: education and job training, and military training and volunteerism. All information in this appendix was obtained from a draft working paper of the Directorate of Civil-Military Programs entitled Civil-Military Programs: Contributing to Rebuilding America and to Military Readiness.

Job Training and Education Programs:

ChalleNGe - ChalleNGe is run by the National Guard and involves a 22-week residential program followed by a year long post-residential mentoring program. It is targeted at 16 to 18 year old high school dropouts who are drug-free and not in serious trouble with the law. Program attributes include GED or high school diploma completion, involvement with community projects, and citizenship, health, hygiene, skills, leadership, and physical training. The program started in ten states in June 1993 (Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New York, Oklahoma, and West Virginia) and expanded to another six states in 1994 (Alaska, Hawaii, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Virginia). A total of \$56 million was budgeted for ChalleNGe in fiscal 1994.

Starbase - Starbase is a National Guard program that had a budget of \$4 million in fiscal 1994. It is a nonresidential program for kindergarten through twelfth grade students and their teachers. The program looks to expose classes, primarily those of inner-city schools, to "real world" math and science applications. Starbase began in June 1993 in seven states (California, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, and Vermont) and was expanded to another five states in 1994 (Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Oklahoma, and South Dakota).

Two other offshoots of Starbase are Starbase Atlantis and Starbase Kelly. Starbase Atlantis is a combined National Guard, Navy, and Naval Reserve effort located in Pensacola, Florida. It is based on the original Starbase program and is

conducted for elementary through high school. The budget for Starbase Atlantis for fiscal 1994 was \$340 thousand. Starbase Kelly began on January 30th, 1995 in San Antonio, Texas. It is run by the Air Force Reserve and has a \$340 thousand budget for fiscal 1995.

Youth Conservation Corps & Urban Youth Corps - The Youth Conservation Corps is run by the National Guard and is a six-week residential version of the Challenge program without the goal of GED completion. It is held at National and is aimed at providing learning through service. The Urban Youth Corps is also run by the National Guard. It is a six-week non-residential version of Challenge held in inner-city armories and also excludes the GED goal. These programs began in 1994 in California, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin under Congressional authorization. Roughly \$5 million was budgeted for these programs in fiscal 1994.

Seaborne Conservation Corps - The Seaborne Conservation Corps (SCC) is a program similar to Challenge that combines the efforts of the Navy, Marine Corps, National Guard, Texas A&M University at Galveston, and Americorps (from President Clinton's National Service program). The SCC operates from a ship docked in Galveston and its aim is job training and placement in the maritime field along with environmental service projects in the Galveston Bay/Houston area. One hundred youths are run through SCC each cycle and the fiscal 1994 budget included \$1.5 million from Civil-Military programs along with \$1.25 million each from the Texas National Guard and Americorps. This funding provides for operating and maintenance costs, living expenses, and educational awards. Additionally, Texas A&M University allowed SCC participants to use their recreation facilities. Future plans for SCC include shifting the cost for the program to private industry and state or local government.

Civil Air Patrol Falcon Flight Program - This program involves sixth grade students. It runs from January to May and prepares the students for induction into Civil Air Patrol (CAP) squadrons. It is aimed at recruiting "at risk" young people and inspiring them to become leaders and good citizens through their interest in aerospace. The program attempts to ensure the success of the participants at the CAP summer camp along with acceptance into the CAP Cadet Program. \$42,906 is budgeted for the Falcon Flight Program.

Community and Service Leadership Camp - The Community and Service Leadership Camp (CSLC) is a proposal incorporating the Army Reserve, Cities in Schools Inc., and the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Career Academies. Two hundred young people from forty cities across the country will be selected

to attend a summer camp focusing on citizenship, leadership, personal confidence, and community service. The aim of the program will be for the participants to design and complete supervised community service projects in their hometowns. The CSLC has a budget of \$350,000, will be held in Scotland, Pennsylvania, and is tentatively scheduled for mid-July through mid-August of 1995.

National Civilian Community Corps - The National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC) is a demonstration National Service Program aimed at giving 18-24 year olds the opportunity to help meet domestic needs of the country. One thousand participants will receive living expenses and either an educational credit worth up to \$4,725 or a post-service cash benefit of half the amount in exchange for a year of public and community service in areas of educational, environmental, health and human needs, or public safety concern. Congress directed DOD to help get the program started. The thousand participants will be housed and trained on four military bases. Additionally, military members forced to leave the service due to downsizing have the opportunity to serve on the permanent staff of the NCCC and provide training and leadership to NCCC members. Retired military personnel are also able to qualify for more retirement credit through participation in the NCCC program.

JROTC Career Academies - The JROTC Academies are a joint DOD/Department of Education program looking to provide inner-city high school students with a special academic, vocational, and JROTC-intensive program. They are a "school within a school" with approximately 200 students. The students attend classes together and benefit from a designated staff, reduced class size, an advisory board, local business support, and sponsorship. The program seeks to combine high school graduation with job and social skills development.

The JROTC Academies are five-year programs initially supported by Defense Conversion and Reinvestment funds with the goal of school and business support and maintenance by the end of the period. The Academies are being implemented in phases. Seven "demonstration" academies were opened in the 1993-94 academic year and two more in 1994-95. Twenty-one "expansion" academies were opened in 1994-95. Additionally, ten more academies will open in 1995-96. In fiscal 1994, \$6.8 million was budgeted for these programs.

Military Training and Volunteerism:

GuardCare - This pilot program aims to provide medical service to underserved populations. Army Reserve and Guard personnel conduct the program in partnership with states and often the

Public Health Service and costs are shared. In fiscal 1994 more than 18,000 patients were seen and the program is currently established in 13 states (Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington). The military personnel and units receive actual training while attempting to heighten readiness for deployment.

MERLIN - MERLIN is an acronym for Medical Readiness Learning Initiative. It is a computer simulation program aimed at increasing medical readiness skills for both wartime use and allowing military medical members to train and operate in the civilian medical community. MERLIN offers distance learning through access at any training center or medical unit via the Internet.

CAREFORCE - CAREFORCE is a civil-military partnership providing a team approach to supporting the underserved population in inner-city trauma centers. Military medical personnel augment permanent staff in civilian hospitals to enhance disaster response capabilities. The military members are able to experience "real world" medical situations applicable to wartime readiness needs.

Arch Angel - Arch Angel is scheduled for August 1995 and will involve personnel deployed to an inner-city area of St. Louis. It will be a Regional Interagency Contingency Training and Assessment Platform. While providing physical exams and immunizations in a medically underserved area, military medical personnel will be able to integrate with the civilian medical community trauma and casualty assets in an operational setting. Arch Angel will allow assessment of the success of the MERLIN and CAREFORCE programs in meeting readiness requirements.

Reef-Ex - Reef-Ex is a DOD environmental project using the Army Material Command to create artificial offshore reefs. Obsolete battle tanks are prepared to meet Environmental Protection Agency standards, shipped to ports, and then placed on selected reef sites. The program placed 114 tanks off Alabama, Florida, and New Jersey in fiscal 1994 and nearly 1,000 tanks will be used in fiscal 1995. DOD and states involved share project costs and Army personnel receive the benefit of actual training in vehicle inspection, preparation, maintenance, storage, and shipment.

Operation KotzebueCare - This project has been initiated by the U.S. Marine Forces Reserve to provide dental health services to Native Alaskans. Roughly 1,600 inhabitants of three native villages in the Kotzebue region will benefit from

the mission to be conducted between February and March 1995. The service personnel will receive the experience of actual operations in a remote setting.

Fourth Cliff Family Recreation Area - In the Boston, Massachusetts area, the Army Reserve, along with other Reserve and Active groups, is using volunteer service personnel to provide job skills training to disadvantaged 15-17 year old youths. The male and female participants will be able to learn carpentry, landscaping, painting and plumbing journeyman skills. The program is planned for nationwide introduction to assist more than a thousand young people during July and August 1995.

Winslow - Winslow is an exercise involving the Army Reserve and the Winslow Indian Health Center (WIHC). The Army Reserve is providing a Deployable Medical Facility, personnel and equipment during a major renovation of the WIHC. During the course of Winslow, medical care for the Navajo nation will continue (WIHC serves more than 55,000 ambulatory patients a year) and reserve personnel will gain the benefit of conducting actual operations with a different culture while deployed to a remote location. Winslow is scheduled to continue for six to nine months into fiscal 1995.

**APPENDIX D. U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING,
1948-1995**

Operation Location Dates	# of Nations Involved	# of Personnel (all nations) at Max Strength	# of U.S. Troops Involved (as of 3/3/95)
UNTSO Middle East 1948 -	19	220	17
UNGOMIP Kashmir, Pakistan 1948 -	8	39	U.S. involvement ended in 1954
UNIKOM Iraq, Kuwait APR 1991 -	33	367	15
MINURSO Western Sahara APR 1991 -	28	348	30
UNPROFOR former Yugoslavia FEB 1992 -	35	25,612	861
UNTAC Cambodia FEB 1992 - OCT 1994	36	9,534	33 (at peak)
UNOSOM II Somalia MAY 1993 - MAR 1995	28	28,000	2,833 (at peak)
UNOMIG Georgia AUG 1993 -	--	--	4
UNMIH Haiti SEP 1993 -	--	--	212

Source: Adapted from Marjorie Ann Brown, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 1988-1993: Background Information," Congressional Research Service Report 93-993F, 1993 and Marjorie Ann Brown, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Issue Brief IB90103, 1995.

APPENDIX E. USAF AIR MOBILITY COMMAND SUPPORT OF NON-TRADITIONAL MISSIONS, JUNE 1992 - DECEMBER 1994

Time Period	# of Missions	Tons of Cargo	# of People	Name of Operation	Location
Jun92-May93	109	2438	--	Provide Hope	Fmr Soviet Union
Jul92-Sep93	1694	6515	35035	Provide Promise	Bosnia
Aug92-Oct92	326	264	8805	Provide Transition	Angola
Aug92-Feb93	3100	34400	--	Provide Relief	Somalia
Aug92-Oct92	724	21500	13500	Hurricane Andrew	Florida
Aug92	1	--	70	med transport of Chernobyl children	
Sep92	59	2000	750	Typhoon Omar	Guam
Sep92-Oct92	259	9200	8600	Hurricane Iniki	Hawaii
Sep92	94	1168	974	Impressive Lift	Pakistan
Oct92	--	--	96	NEO	Liberia
Oct92	1	--	21	NEO	Tajikistan
Nov92	5	236	--	relief supplies	Armenia
Dec92	6	415	--	flood relief	Pakistan
Dec92-May93	1182	41243	51431	Restore Hope	Somalia
Feb93-Mar93	6	157	930	Provide Refuge	Kwajalein
May93	24	326	254	peacekeepers	Cambodia
Jul93	20	850	334	UNPROFOR	Macedonia
Jul93-Aug93	20	797	141	flood relief Iowa/Illinois/Missouri	
Aug93	3	--	--	3 Bailey bridges	Nepal
Aug93	6	--	400	Army Rangers to	Somalia
Oct93	2	--	--	earthquake relief	Bombay, India
Oct93	56	3000	1300	Army forces to	Somalia
Oct93	3	250	350	Nepalese peacekeepers to	Somalia
Jan94	10	170	270	earthquake relief	Los Angeles
Apr94	16	--	--	U.S./Belgian personnel to	Rwanda
May94	13	239	--	Rwandan refugee aid to	Tanzania
Jun94	1	34	--	MRI to Chernobyl	Chernobyl
Jul94-Sep94	700	23000	11000	Support Hope	Uganda (Rwanda)
Sep94-Dec94	1528	--	--	Uphold/Maintain Democracy -	Haiti
Oct94	1	20	--	flood relief	Vladivostok
Nov94	3	1	--	Sapphire (uranium)	Kazakhstan

Source: Adapted from Air Mobility Command Office of Military History, "Air Mobility Command: Historical Chronologies," 1995.

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